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Abstract 
In this paper we apply an implicit threshold approach, malleable to the principle of graduation, to 
identify countries that should benefit from derogations from WTO TRIPS commitments for 
pharmaceutical patents under the tenets of Special and Differential Treatment. This is based on the 
identification of four broad constraints loosely classified as; economic constraints; access to 
pharmaceuticals; capacity constraints; and incidence of health outcomes. We identify these by means 
of analytical criteria and create a composite index that ranks countries according to the observed 
constraints which delimit the capabilities and desirability of implementing TRIPs disciplines. We 
discuss the use of negotiated weights and thresholds in determining participation and graduation into 
general provisions of the agreement. It follows that countries below the chosen threshold should be 
exempt from these hence receiving Special and Differential Treatment. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction, during the Uruguay Round, of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) to the remit of the WTO led to a broader debate on the desirability of having patent 
protection controls in developing countries. In this paper we focus on the possible costs and benefits 
of derogations from international patent protection provisions so as to identify countries that should 
benefit from a modulation of WTO commitments under the tenets of Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT). We place particular emphasis on the desirability of such practices in the presence of 
both health and economic outcomes. In the process we aim to ‘draw the line’ (Deardorf, 1990) 
between countries that should and should not implement patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products in a way that maximises welfare but imposes the lowest negative externalities on the 
innovation process. To this end we employ an implicit threshold approach to arrive at a composite 
indicator that aggregates the main constraints that countries face in implementing WTO TRIPS 
provisions for patents in the pharmaceutical sector.   
The problem is simple, the transposition of legislation and establishment of enforcement mechanisms 
for patent protection are costly and particularly so when the benefits of these largely accrue to firms in 
developed countries (Maskus 2000 and Lall & Albadejo, 2002). Furthermore the enforcement of these 
provisions affects both the price and accessibility of needed medicines. This results in an important 
asymmetry between the bearers of the costs and benefits of patent protection where the wedge 
between these tilts unfavourably for developing countries. A coherent international system should 
take these constraints into consideration in its application of differential treatment where modulation 
of commitments should be sought for a selection of developing countries. But in the process it must 
also provide a mechanism ensuring that pharmaceutical firms can reap the benefits of their innovative 
undertakings. One then needs to find an arbiter for the said modulation which takes into account the 
dynamics of country constraints in facing the aforementioned costs and benefits. This is not a new 
idea and one that has received strong support from the likes of Cottier (2006), Hoekman et al (2003), 
Keck and Low (2004), Micholoupoulos (2000) and Stevens (2002). This strand of literature proposes 
making participation into particular WTO agreements contingent on a set of observable and common 
analytical criteria. It is on the shoulders of this literature that we put forward a case study on the 
possible selection criteria that can be applied to the implementation of TRIPS provisions on patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals in developing countries. The aim of this paper is hence not to justify 
the case for SDT per se, but rather to identify and utilise a set of common constraints that countries 
share in an implicit threshold approach, malleable to the principle of graduation, to identify countries 
that should benefit from derogations from WTO provisions.  
The main challenge is then to identify and apply analytical criteria that capture these constraints so 
that derogations from TRIPS provisions can be targeted to countries that justifiably need these the 
most and not to those that have arbitrarily self-selected into the ‘development’ group. We draw on the 
World Bank (2001) conclusions departing from the assumption that, for the case of pharmaceutical 
patent protection, the efficiency of applying these provisions “depends on economic and social 
circumstances”. To the extent that the economic benefits from patent protection largely accrue to 
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countries with a high share of R&D expenditure in GDP (World Bank, 2001), developing countries 
could have little to gain from implementing such provisions into national legislation. But derogations 
from patent protection need be weighed against the long term goals of ensuring appropriate access to 
particular drugs that are much needed in response to health conditions that plague developing 
countries in greater abundance. The heterogeneity of social and health circumstances across 
developing countries presents an important case for the modulation of commitments under WTO 
legislation relating to TRIPs that go beyond the current delayed implementation provisions. Lall & 
Albaladejo (2002, p.9) go as far as arguing that, after considering the present value of the weighted 
long term benefits against the short term costs, a differentiated approach to TRIPs is “undisputable”. 
This makes echo to a strong call for differential treatment for developing countries made by Oxfam 
(2001). 
The primer under which this differentiation is to be carried out depends on the constraints that 
developing countries face in implementing such policies and in particular the associated costs that 
implementation generates. In light of these, any analytical criteria identified for the purposes of 
differentiation should not only be closely related to an identified ‘constraint’, but also be acquiescent 
to the principle of graduation (Cottier 2006). This principle seeks to provide an added flexibility to the 
international system by making implementation of WTO provisions contingent on overcoming a set 
of identified graduating constraints. Countries that fall below a chosen threshold would be entitled to 
derogations with respect to countries that fall above these. This method would be applied on a 
continuous basis so that the modulation of commitments would only kick-in when a set of observable 
constraints have been overcome. The first step towards the operationalisation of this proposition 
hence requires looking into the main implementation constraints faced by countries in transposing 
WTO TRIPs commitments. On a broad scale, and for the particular case of patent protection under 
the TRIPs agreement, we show that these constraints relate to the broader category of domestic 
regulatory reform. This in turn suggests that the costs of implementation will depend on issues such as 
institutional constraints related to both capacity and budgetary allocation; opportunity costs; as well as 
issues of national health systems and health security. Any form of progressive regulation need take 
into account the priorities of developing countries in this respect but must also consider the impact 
that non-participation will have on third countries.  
We believe that there is certainly a case for protecting intellectual property rights and hold the 
recognition of this in the WTO as evidence of an implicit support to the notion of modulation of 
general principles in the presence of new issues that may require differential treatment such as TRIPs1. 
But we equally hold true that the benefits of patent protection are skewed towards developed country 
interests. These serve to promote, via a form of industrial policy, the development of a strong 
pharmaceutical industry in high income countries (Maskus 2000). Enforcing these provisions comes 
at the cost of beneficial technological transfers to the developing world and increases the dependence 
on pharmaceutical imports from developed countries. This sets in motion a vicious circle which may 
lead to capacity shortcomings in a way that is reminiscent of the food security argument. Maskus 
                                                            
1 This alludes to the rather uncomfortable position of promoting protectionism where the WTO/GATT has generally been at 
the forefront of world liberalisation of trade. 
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(2000) alludes to this by arguing that the presence of onerous patenting provisions may impede the 
development of needed industrial capabilities in developing countries. These can be attained through 
the process of ‘imitating’ pharmaceutical production and can provide important benefits as the case of 
India exemplifies (see Lall & Albaladejo (2002) and Watal 2000). A mitigating factor to the loss of 
revenue that improper patent protection may incur on pharmaceutical firms is that this may be short 
lived because anecdotal evidence suggests that a lax patent enforcement mechanism sets in motion the 
needed incentives for the creation of coherent patent enforcement mechanisms. This is because as 
countries develop domestic capacity then firms will demand the presence of a fully functioning 
patenting mechanism so as to protect their innovative activities (Maskus 2000).  
We also recognise that patent protection bears certain similarities to an old time argument for import 
substitution and hence liken the emergence of this to the push towards special and differential 
treatment2. One key but often forgotten point is the notion of national sovereignty over health 
outcomes3. This extends the principle of food security to health outcomes. The development of an 
appropriate system of industrial production in pharmaceuticals can have wide ranging implications 
for the supply of key pharmaceuticals needed to abate health concerns4. In this respect one can make a 
case for policies that encourage national production of generic pharmaceuticals. However, this need 
be weighed against the feasibility of attaining such goals using industrial policy. If countries require 
productive endowments and technological advances that are beyond their capabilities or reach, then 
importing such products remains the most viable option. The issue then becomes one of facilitating 
access for such products in markets where budgetary constraints exacerbate consumption given 
monopoly pricing. 
One of the underlying assumptions of this paper is that there is an important argument for facilitating 
access of pharmaceutical products into countries that are most vulnerable. These countries tend to 
face a set of constraints that make purchase of such products costly not only in relative but also in real 
terms. In addition, these countries tend to be characterised by weaker health systems which entail a 
greater spread of illness and a lower capacity of reaction to national emergencies. On the basis of an 
identification of these constraints and taking into account the heterogeneity of incidence of these 
across the WTO defined ‘development’ group, we aim to provide a finer and more targeted 
differentiation schedule for the identification of countries which could benefit from SDT provisions. 
This in view of providing a more systematic approach to SDT in the context of the TRIPS agreement.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide a discussion on the 
different inbuilt flexibilities of the TRIPs agreement and how these may not necessarily provide 
sufficient policy space for the particular concerns of developing countries. We then focus on the 
economic rationale of patent protection where we argue, on the basis of Deardorff (1992), that there 
might be a case for a geographical differentiation in patent protection provisions. This is then followed 
                                                            
2 Albeit operating in the favour of developing countries 
3 The political climate in the Developing world during  the 50’s and 60’s was of the opinion that self sufficiency in key sectors 
(known as base industries) was of uttermost importance, the pharmaceutical sector was viewed in this guise.  
4 The case of India and Brazil tend to be used in the literature as countries that have succeeded in creating the appropriate 
incentives to develop a strong pharmaceutical industry. 
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by an extensive review of the possible constraints that make developing countries particularly 
vulnerable to patent protection enforcement. The identification of these constraints then motivates a 
selection of indicators that capture these constraints. We then look at how these indicators can be 
combined to provide a list of countries that should be exempt from TRIPs provisions for patent 
protection in the pharmaceutical sector. Here we draw not only on indicators of economic 
performance, but also on measures of health risks and institutional constraints in an effort to capture 
the multifaceted nature of the constraints. The generalised example of the Pharmaceutical sector is 
chosen on the basis of Cottier (2006). He suggests that analytical criteria can serve to inform the 
desirability of implementation of the TRIPs agreement in patent protection for pharmaceuticals where 
differentiation and modulation of commitments take a progressive stance and apply differently 
contingent on countries levels of development or economic characteristics in the sector in question. 
Building on this example, we provide an economic rationale for the choice of these criteria and a 
procedural test for the graduating thresholds that could apply for this sector. The final section 
concludes with a discussion on how this methodology can be generalised to other WTO issues.  
2. TRIPS agreement modalities 
There is no specific agreement that establishes particular disciplines for pharmaceutical products in 
terms of intellectual property rights (IPR), however the TRIPS Agreement provides a framework with 
important procedural disciplines. In this section we discuss how these relate to developing countries 
so as to ascertain if there exist sufficient flexibilities in dealing with the particular needs of these 
countries. In the process, and on the basis of these flexibilities, we aim to see if there are implicit 
recognitions of possible constraints that countries may face in the implementation of the TRIPS 
agreement. The entrenched flexibilities in the agreement should reflect these constraints as voiced by 
countries concerns in the implementation of the agreement. We focus solely on the implications for 
the particular case of patent protection for pharmaceuticals and their impact on developing countries.  
The TRIPS Agreement puts forward minimum standards of intellectual property rights common to all 
members5. Whilst additional commitments or disciplines may be introduced by members, protection 
of intellectual property rights remains under the tenets of both the National Treatment (Article II) and 
the most favoured Nation (Article IV) principles. However, and in contrast with other WTO 
agreements where countries can make different commitments (i.e. market access); the TRIPS 
agreement establishes disciplines that all members must comply with devoid of distinctions according 
to levels of development. For example, in terms of patents, all members are obliged to give the same 
level of protection to all patented products. The only form of differential treatment afforded to 
developing countries is an extended period for the implementation and modification of national 
legislation to accommodate the totality of the TRIPs agreement6. This is however a standard 
‘transitional’ provision common across most WTO agreements which may be ill suited to the 
particular needs and constraints faced in certain developing countries. It implicitly recognises the 
                                                            
5 Article II, par. 1, TRIPS 
6 References to Developing Countries and Least-Developed countries appear twice and six times respectively in the whole 
agreement, all of them in Part VI, Transitional Arrangements. 
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existence of diverging technical capabilities across countries in implementing agreements but 
presupposes that countries will be able to tackle these constraints in a fixed amount of time. The 
heterogeneity in capacity across the developing country grouping suggests that a common time lapse 
for implementation may be ill-suited and calls for SDT to be contingent on certain observable 
analytical criteria which delimit that these capacity constraints have been overcome7. This principle of 
graduation should be coherent with a set of analytical criteria that serve to identify the main 
constraints that countries face.  
Section 5 of the TRIPS agreement outlines the disciplines on patents that are most relevant to 
pharmaceutical products and which have been subject to most contention. In general terms, TRIPs 
establishes that patents must be available to both products and processes without discriminating 
across the location of the invention or the field of technology, for a period not inferior to 20 years 
(Article 33). Article 28 then establishes the scope of protection where the patent must prevent other 
parties (without the patent owner consent) from making, using, selling or importing a patented 
product or process; as well as making, using, selling or importing a product obtained directly from a 
patented process.  
In recognition of possible constraints in meeting the TRIPs agreement commitments, certain 
flexibilities were introduced to mitigate negative impacts on health outcomes. These were in the form 
of ‘compulsory licenses’ and ‘exhaustion of rights’ which aim at ensuring that the appropriate balance 
between the benefits of innovation and the costs of monopoly pricing is achieved. These flexibilities 
are however available to all signatories and hence do not constitute a form of SDT although they can 
be useful to developing countries in certain ways. Their main function is to control monopolist 
pricing strategies where compulsory licenses grant derogations from patent enforcement whilst 
exhaustion of rights seeks to reduce price discrimination. The implications of these for developing 
countries are discussed at greater lengths bellow where particular attention is given to the 
identification of constraints that these flexibilities aim to provide shelter from.  
2.1 Compulsory Licenses 
Compulsory Licenses serve the purpose of providing flexibility in the enforcement of patents under 
special mitigating circumstances. These are open to all WTO members and additive to the exceptions 
outlined in article 27, where members may exclude, from patent protection, inventions with the 
objective of protecting the “ordre public or morality”8. Article 31 allows some leeway in using patented 
inventions without the authorisation of the right holder. The article, rather than define an exception, 
imposes limitations on what is called a “compulsory license” where a license to manufacture the 
patented product is granted to a government or a third party, without authorisation or over the 
objection of the right holder. Article 31 (b) then establishes that a compulsory license is permissible if 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms 
                                                            
7 Oxfam (2001) makes this point in its key demands to the WTO where they call for “longer transition periods for developing 
countries before they have to implement TRIPS, based on their attainment of development milestones rather than arbitrary 
dates” 
8 as well as the protection of human, animal and plant life in addition to the environment; 
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and conditions have anticipated its use. However, this limitation may be waived in the case of a 
“national emergency”.  Art. 31 (f) also establishes that a compulsory license shall be granted 
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market” and also, that the right holder must be paid 
remuneration for such use taking into account the economic value of the authorization (Art. 31 (h)). 
These provisions raise a number of interpretational issues such as the length and depth of the 
attempted negotiations for licensing undertaken before making effective use of the patented product 
or the exact definition of a “national emergency”9. They equally implicitly recognise that there are 
special circumstances that demand special consideration and hence point to a set of possible existing 
constraints or negative impacts that arise in complying with WTO TRIPs provisions. 
In 2001 these interpretational issues were partially addressed in the “Declaration on the TRIPs 
Agreement and Public Health”. According to the Declaration, Members have the right to determine 
what constitutes a ‘national emergency’ or other circumstances of equal extreme urgency. Where these 
are concerned, there is specific reference to AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics as cases 
that may trigger such conditions. But this leaves open the decision on what constitutes a case for 
granting a compulsory license to the discretion of each Member10. On the other hand, it was seen that, 
for most Developing Countries and almost all Least Developed Countries, the possibility of granting a 
compulsory licence could be an ineffective tool to deal with their concerns. This is because most of 
these countries have neither the productive nor the knowledge capabilities that the production of 
these types of drugs requires (Sykes, 2002). Particularly, most LDCs lack both the quality and quantity 
of human resources necessary to produce simple medicines. These domestic supply constraints result 
in countries’ over reliance on imports to obtain medicines which raise concerns of access to drugs and 
security of supply. Article 31 (f) of the TRIPs Agreement would only allow for compulsory licences to 
supply domestic markets and, therefore, limit the possibility of importing cheaper generic 
pharmaceuticals from other countries by the least developed Members. In recognition of this 
shortcoming, which serves as an implicit identification of important supply side constraints, the 
interpretation of Paragraph 6 of the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPs served to provide a partial 
waiver on Article 31 (f). It would allow some exporting countries to supply a limited quantity of a 
patented product and for a limited time to an eligible importing country. But the system would be 
limited to cases of national emergency or for public non-commercial use and available to those that 
notified the use of such measures to the Council for TRIPs11. In terms of payment to the right holder, 
the importer country would be waived from Article 31 (h) provisions of payment to the right holder as 
long as the exporter country had paid remuneration. These exceptions have now been included in 
Article 31 bis of the TRIPs agreement in the Hong Kong Ministerial of 2005. They wait for approval 
by two thirds of members for the amendments to be passed, till then the 2003 waiver applies.  
                                                            
9 In addition to the definition of ‘reasonable commercial terms’.  
10 In fact, the notion of “other epidemics” further leaves room for the justification of granting licenses to manufacture drugs 
in circumstances where any disease emerges where cases are above previous levels of incidence 
11 Paragraph 1. b of the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health 
declares as eligible importing country to “...any least-developed country Member, and any other Member that has made a 
notification to the Council of TRIPS of its intention to use the system as an importer” 
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But the use of the provisions established in Paragraph 6 remains low; to date, only two notifications to 
the Council on TRIPS have been made on one single operation of supply of medicines12. On October 
2010 a meeting of the WTO intellectual property council made the first in depth analysis of these 
provisions13. It concluded that the notification procedures appeared to be too burdensome for some 
members. India was of this opinion arguing that the system of notifications could be too costly and 
cumbersome for importing countries. Developed countries on the other hand suggested that the low 
utilisation of this provision reflected other constraints such as health infrastructure, taxes and import 
duties which would need to be considered in granting rights to affordable access to medicines. The 
low utilisation of the provision hint at implementation problems as the procedure does not seem to be 
particularly onerous. It requires a simple and short notification containing information about the 
quantities and the type of medicine to be imported under compulsory licence. This suggests that there 
are perhaps other impediments to the use of such provisions. But these may be hard to capture given 
the lack of available information on the attempts to use these provisions. The unsuccessful intentions 
to use these may point to problems in the remuneration procedure. Paragraph 3 of the decision on the 
implementation of Paragraph 6 established that the exporter and not the importer is to pay 
remuneration “taking into account the economic value to the importing Member”. This could be a 
source of conflict with the right holder that may lead to the decision of not using the system if high 
payments are required. Unfortunately, there is little information about the occurrence of these 
instances.  
The provisions for compulsory licences follow the general spirit of applicability of the agreement and 
are extended to all members irrespective of the level of development. However, Developed Countries 
conceded that they would not use such provisions as importers. This then establishes the provision as 
a de facto form of SDT in favour of Developing Countries and LDCs14. In the process of analysing the 
compulsory license provisions two important constraints that countries may face in implementing 
TRIPs emerge. The first relates to ‘health emergencies’ that supports the notion of derogations to 
general principles in the presence of constraining circumstances. The second is the problem of 
productive capacity constraints which are implicitly recognised in the interpretation of Paragraph 6. 
2.2 Price discrimination and parallel imports 
The exhaustion of intellectual property rights can play a role in helping developing country access 
important pharmaceutical products by acting on the price mechanism. However article 6 of the TRIPs 
Agreement suggests that exhaustion remains the competence of member countries where it states that 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights”. Exhaustion of IPRs is important because it deals with the question of resale of patented 
products to other markets. Full exhaustion implies that once a patented product has been sold, the 
Intellectual property associated with it is “exhausted” upon the first sale and hence the patent holders’ 
rights are not enforceable in subsequent sales. The issue becomes relevant for the patent holder since, 
                                                            
12Canada reported its intention to export a particular drug to Rwanda for the treatment of HIV in 2007 IP/N/10/CAN/1 
13 Minutes of the meeting were not disclosed. A summary of the meeting can be found in 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_26oct10_e.htm 
14 Par. 1 b. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health 
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if rights are exhausted after the first sale, it cannot enforce any price discrimination. This is important 
for Developing Countries since, besides transport costs or other trade barriers, it gives them the 
opportunity of importing a patented product from the country where a lower price is charged. The 
WTO jargon refers to this instance as “parallel imports”15.  It provides countries that face productive 
capacity constraints some flexibility in their access to pharmaceuticals.  
Cottier (1998) and Lahouel & Maskus (1999) offer a discussion on the legal debate in the 
interpretation of the exhaustion of property rights. In general terms these may be exhausted nationally 
or internationally16. In the first case rights end upon the first sale within a particular national territory 
but right holders may impede parallel trade with other countries. In the second case, rights are 
exhausted upon the first sale in any given market hence providing a means for parallel imports. Article 
6 of TRIPS maintains national prerogatives as regulators of these provided national and MFN 
treatment are adhered to.1718 . It is generally recognised that international exhaustion is more 
favourable for developing countries because it facilitates parallel imports.  However Sykes (2002) 
argues differently. If monopolists are unable to effectively price discriminate, theory suggests that they 
will charge the standard monopoly price uniformly across markets. This price is expected to be higher 
for developing countries than that which would be faced under a price discrimination scenario hence 
making consumers in developing country markets worse off. This then suggests that the effects of 
international exhaustion of IPRs on access to affordable pharmaceuticals in Developing country 
markets is ambiguous. On the one hand it is desirable because it enables parallel imports, but on the 
other it may apply upward pressure on the prices hence reducing the effective access to much needed 
medicaments.   
One should not analyse the effects of the exhaustion of IPRs on price discrimination in isolation to the 
pricing strategies of large companies, particularly those that operate with distributors and licensees. 
This is because these private interactions will also determine the extent to which firms can price 
discriminate. Maskus and Chen (2004) suggest that local distributors may have incentives to make 
profits by cross-hauling products to other countries without the prior authorisation of the 
manufacturer (parallel imports). This would then imply the partial removal of price discrimination 
through arbitrage which would result in a convergence of retail prices. However, the feasibility of such 
practices will depend on the level of enforcement of the licenses and in particular the control that the 
producers have over the distributors. License holders may threaten distributors not to renew their 
rights if these are not respecting the areas assigned to them. If license holders operate through tighter 
controls then they can effectively control the cross-hauling process and hence implement price 
discrimination. Large pharmaceutical conglomerates tend to have physical presence in developing 
                                                            
15 The concerns they raise are not dissimilar to those found in Free Trade Areas where countries avoid the entry of products 
via the lowest tariff through the use of Rules of Origin. 
16 Regional exhaustion is also possible 
17 This view is then reinforced in article 5 of the Declaration of the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health of 2001 by stating 
that “The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to 
leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge...”. Article 5, paragraph d. 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
18 The European Union, for example, has decided not to change its community-wide regime to international exhaustion. 
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countries either through local representatives or production facilities19. Even without production 
facilities, a local branch or representative is in charge of the commercialisation of the marketed 
products20. These branches do not operate in complete independence and their marketing strategies in 
each country as well as their import sources may be decided in the respective headquarters. These 
global supply strategies can effectively serve to price discriminate hence rendering any principle of 
exhaustion of property rights ineffective. Even with permissiveness for parallel imports, the choice of 
the origin of imports is curtailed by the conglomerates’ global supply strategies and hence price 
discrimination remains possible. This then renders principles of exhaustion ineffective. 
Overall, the varying provisions that aim at providing flexibility in the implementation of the TRIPs 
agreement provide unclear benefits to developing countries. Nonetheless, they help us identify the 
main constraints that countries may face in implementing patent protection. The presence of a 
‘compulsory licenses’ provision within the agreement implicitly recognises that certain circumstances, 
such as national emergencies, demand special treatment. Indeed the Interpretation of paragraph 6 of 
the Doha declaration provided a strong basis for the precedent of public health over private property. 
Hence an identification of the occurrence of these special circumstances may serve the purpose of 
applying derogations to the general principles. This may be achieved through the use of analytical 
criteria that identify incidence of health emergencies over ‘normal’ values. Adding to this the issue of 
exhaustion also points to a broader problem in the pharmaceutical industry that is related to price 
dispersion. Countries which may be budget constrained may need to call in mechanisms that ensure 
appropriate supply of pharmaceuticals where compulsory licenses are useless due to supply capacity 
constraints in domestic markets. An identification of such constraints would also help inform possible 
derogations from general principles which ensure an appropriate access to needed pharmaceuticals. 
But before turning to the identification of these constraints by way of analytical criteria and the 
application of graduating thresholds, one need look into the economics of patent protection to 
determine the possible impact of these derogations on economic welfare. 
3. The Economics of Patent Protection and the case of Developing Countries 
The rationale for awarding patent protection to any industry derives from the recognition that some 
processes of innovation are costly and would not be undertaken unless protection is granted. 
Innovators are awarded patent protection through the conferral of monopolistic powers that aid to 
cover the R&D costs of the process of innovation. However, as in any monopolistic setting, 
inefficiencies arise via the sub-optimal consumption (supply) of the monopolistic product. Patent 
protection is hence to act as a balancing tool between the needed incentives for the innovative process 
and the inefficiencies generated through monopoly rents. Whilst these are generally mediated through 
an arbitrary time limited conferral of these monopoly powers, Deardorff (1992) makes an important 
case for the limitation of patenting protection geographically.  He argues that “the case for universal 
                                                            
19 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, Bayer, Glaxo Smith Kline and other big pharmaceutical conglomerates have physical presence 
with production, research and development, commercial or administrative facilities in a wide range of developing countries. 
20 When no local branch or representative is present, a branch or representative in another country is the one designated to 
commercialise their products in that country 
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patent protection is not a clear one [...] and that the concerns of some developing countries that they 
will be exploited by patent protection are not without foundation”. Deardorff’s (1992) theoretical 
model provides an important justification to the case of SDT in the application of TRIPs provisions 
for patenting pharmaceuticals based on distributional welfare effects. He demonstrates how these 
skew the benefits towards the producers of products with higher patent protection.  The welfare 
implications are not innocuous given the explicit reference to “social and economic welfare” in the 
TRIPs Agreement objectives set out in article 7. However recognition is also awarded to the need to 
“balance rights and obligations” referring to the process of knowledge creation and transmission.  
Where patent provision to the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries is concerned there is 
an overarching issue of health security where derogations need be tamed by the possible economic 
externalities these generate. A lax enforcement of patent systems can affect the innovation process 
through an inappropriate mix of incentives which may lead to negative and potentially long term 
consequences for developing countries at the expense of short term goals. An important facet to 
consider in the case of pharmaceutical products is that the technology needed for their development 
exhibits the properties of public goods. Once a drug is developed, the ingredients and the dosage in 
which these are to be mixed are easily replicable. The non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of this 
type of technological progress can then lead to free riding which can affect the innovation process. 
The misappropriation of technological knowhow can result in an inappropriate distribution of the 
costs of innovation in turn resulting in lower (sub-optimal) undertakings of innovative endeavours 
which are beneficial to society. Patent protection can then be invoked to act as a balancing tool 
between the innovative process and the distribution of the proceeds of the technology by reducing the 
free-riding element and ensuring that the returns are awarded to the innovating firm21.  
The model discussed in Deardorff (1992) is particularly illuminating because it underlines the 
tensions between producers and consumers of products with strong R&D content. The model is one 
with two countries and a continuum of possible inventions. Gains are derived from an increased 
consumption or availability of new inventions but these need be weighed against the losses that 
transpire from the loss in consumer welfare as a result of monopoly pricing. Extending patent 
protection generates an unambiguous gain for the firms (countries) that develop inventions, however 
countries that do not produce these products end up transferring their consumer surplus to those that 
do. This very simple model clearly exposes the tensions in the debate held in international fore. The 
main proponents of patent protection are those who derive the associated monopoly profits, which are 
generally developed economies, but these clash with those that transfer their consumer surplus which 
tend to be the developing countries. Deardorff (1992) suggest that the balancing act between the 
benefits derived from the process of innovation and the costs of monopoly pricing is asymmetrical 
where the first of these sees important diminishing returns. This then suggests that extending patent 
protection to all countries is suboptimal as the negative impact of monopoly pricing becomes greater 
in the margin. He concludes that “as more and more of the world is already covered by patent 
                                                            
21 But is it worthwhile noting that awarding patents is not the only compensating mechanism, and perhaps not even the most 
efficient one, for clearing these tensions between suppliers and consumers. Some may argue that subsidising R&D 
expenditure may provide an alternate control mechanism. 
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protection, the extra market that can be covered, and hence the extra invention that can be stimulated 
by extending patent protection still further, becomes smaller. Thus, at some point the costs due to 
extending monopoly pricing to existing inventions come to outweigh the benefits of generating new 
ones”. 
Whilst Deardorff’s (1992) model exhibits certain shortcomings accruing to the linear and static nature 
of his theoretical model, some of the assumptions remain pertinent in the case of the pharmaceutical 
sector. One such assumption is the concentration of production in one country/region. Evidence (see 
Table 2) shows that there is indeed an important concentration of pharmaceutical economic activity 
in developed countries which then suggests that the benefits of patent protection largely accrue to 
these countries at the expense of the consumer surplus of developing countries. There is however a 
limiting assumption which can affect Deardorff’s conclusions and is pertinent to our analysis, this is 
that the model does not provide an implicit treatment of the heterogenous demand for ‘inventions’. In 
the case of pharmaceuticals in developing countries it is highly likely that the demand for these differ 
from that of developed countries22. Not extending patent protection to these markets could then result 
in a sub-optimal supply of specialised and much needed pharmaceutical products to developing 
countries. A simple example can illustrate the problem. If most HIV sufferers are located in 
developing countries and there exists no patent protection in these countries, then pharmaceutical 
companies may not engage in developing the necessary drugs for treatment given that there will be no 
guarantee that the investment needed for the development of such drugs would be recouped. If the 
innovative process is demand driven and only targets the concerns of developed countries it is likely 
that pharmaceutical production will be geared to developed country concerns which may not be the 
same as developing country needs. Troullier et al (2002) provide some support to this view by showing 
that drug development is closely associated to market demand forces. They show that only 1% of the 
new chemical products marketed between 1975 and 1999 were registered for diseases such as 
Tuberculosis, Malaria or other diseases which afflict developing countries in greater abundance.  To 
the extent that this is true, then not having patent protection in place can have important negative 
long term consequences for developing countries through the created incentives in the innovation 
process leading to shortfalls in the supply of new innovative drugs to treat endemic developing 
country conditions. But it is equally possible that this low innovative output geared towards 
developing country needs is a result of the low purchasing power in such countries hence the 
introduction of patent protection may only exacerbate the real purchasing powers of medicaments. 
One need bear these longer term consequences in mind when suggesting the application of SDT in 
pharmaceutical products for selected developing countries.  
It is however difficult to reconcile pharmaceutical companies insistence on widespread patent 
enforcement with the amount of patent applications made by right holders in developing countries. 
Attaran (2004) found that pharmaceutical companies were not deeply involved in applying and 
maintaining patents for essential medicines, as defined by the WHO, in developing countries. Where 
these companies had the option of maintaining these, because a patenting law existed, they only 
                                                            
22 Owing to, for example, the heterogenous spread of Malaria which is skewed towards developing countries affecting the 
demand for drugs treating this condition.  
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undertook such actions in 31% of cases. The remarkably low application of patents in developing 
countries may support the notion that the marginal revenue from obtaining a patent, given the level of 
income in some very poor countries, may not be worth the effort. The current trends suggest that 
market size plays a key role where patenting activity tends to be more frequent in countries with larger 
populations and higher income per capita (Attaran 2004 and Watal 2000). This indicates that 
pharmaceutical companies tend to target patent protection towards the upper deciles of the 
distribution of developing countries. But a counterargument to the above may explain the low 
application for patents in developing countries as a result of lax enforcement of IPR in these countries. 
This chicken and egg argument is hard to disentangle. Is patenting of pharmaceuticals in developing 
countries low because of revenue consideration or is it due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms?   
However, the market size argument highlights the possible importance of patenting in not only the 
largest developing countries (China, India, and Brazil) but also those with relatively high income per 
capita such as Argentina23. In fact, the importance and indeed the future demand potential from these 
big developing countries need be considered in the context of modulation of commitments. Nogues 
(1993) points out that in terms of present value, a dollar generated from patent protection today in 
developing countries, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Korea and Taiwan; is worth 
much more than one dollar obtained by extending the patent life in developed countries. This then 
suggests that the size of the possible consumer base and pharmaceutical markets in these countries 
may play a key role in the demands for TRIPS enforcement. 
The economic distribution of gains and losses from the enforcement of patenting provisions need be 
considered when formulating policy, but these are overshadowed by the concerns for health outcomes 
in developing countries. Deardorff’s (1992) model looks at innovative activity, IPR and the 
distribution of rents but not at the impact that monopoly pricing has on access to needed 
pharmaceuticals. In the next section we deal with this issue where we look at the constraints that 
countries encounter in accessing medicines and in setting up health systems. Here we pay particular 
attention to the resources that need be devoted for the implementation of patenting provisions and 
the impact of these on health outcomes.    
4. Constraints faced by Developing Countries in Implementing Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceuticals. 
The endemic health concerns in developing countries are only exacerbated by the lack of access to 
affordable medicines which puts important pressures on health care strategies in these countries. The 
impact of patent protection on the price of pharmaceuticals is a likely contributor to the lack of access 
to affordable medicines but one need note that its elimination will not come as a golden pill. Nor will 
it solve these countries major health issues (Watal 2000). Even in countries where patent laws have 
been permissive, or levels of enforcement are low, access to medicines remains sub-optimal (Attaran, 
                                                            
23 During the 1990’s Argentina was subject to an important pressure from the US to modify its centennial patent laws. In 
1997 the US removed Argentina as beneficiary of preferences in some products in its Generalised System of Preference as a 
retaliation measure. For further details see Vicente (1998) 
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2004). This is because as long as income levels remain low, so too will access to medicines and 
provisions of general health care. 
To operationalise the modulation of WTO TRIPS commitments one needs to identify the main 
constraints that countries face in implementing these commitments. Having already identified some 
of the economic constraints in the previous section we now turn to the more prescient health aspects 
and provide a discussion on how analytical criteria can serve the purpose of capturing these 
constraints. Our main objective is to typify the type of health concerns that exist in developing 
countries so that we may gauge the extent to which countries are constrained in the implementation 
of TRIPS. In the process, and in the spirit of Stevens (2002), we seek to indentify common constraints 
serving the purpose of classifying countries according to shared similarities amongst themselves but 
also shared dissimilarities with respect to other general and more developed groupings. We identify 
three broad categories; the first is access to needed pharmaceuticals; the second relates to capacity in 
meeting health priorities in developing countries; whilst the third occupies the incidence of disease in 
these countries.  
4.1 Access to Pharmaceutical Products 
One of the main contributing factors to the low access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries can 
be seen to be the high prices that these products command. Hoen (2002) makes this important point 
and also underlines that the prevalence of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria, respiratory 
diseases and tuberculosis kills around 10 million people every year where 90% of these are located in 
developing countries. This is significantly higher than the share of the population that they occupy. 
Day (2006) further notes that over 0.5 million children die yearly from AIDS where 95% of these are 
located solely in the African continent24. The high incidence of diseases, coupled with the low 
spending powers of developing countries begs the question of the impact that greater access to 
pharmaceuticals can have on developing country health outcomes. One can ascertain the importance 
of this by comparing the death rates from HIV/AIDS across developed and developing countries 
under the presumption that spending power differences explain some of the variation in outcomes of 
diseases. Xiao (2009), citing figures from the WHO report, suggests that the incidence of death from 
HIV/AIDS is 6,235 times greater in Botswana than it is in the UK. This figure gives us a back of the 
envelope yardstick of the severity of the problem of accessing pharmaceuticals. Whilst this marked 
discrepancy cannot be solely attributed to problems of access to pharmaceuticals, patents, and in 
particular their impact on pricing mechanisms, are likely to play a key role (Hoen 2002). Watal (2000) 
suggests, using evidence for India, that the overall weighted price of pharmaceuticals increased by 26% 
after the introduction of patenting provisions in India. This then suggests that access to 
pharmaceuticals and pricing mechanisms cannot be considered in isolation. 
The first constraint that developing countries face in accessing needed pharmaceuticals is the lack of 
purchasing power due to reduced incomes and high prices. If one is to consider a modular approach 
to SDT in TRIPS one need take into account GDP per capita as a proxy for the shortfall in purchasing 
                                                            
24 The UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010 suggests that two thirds of world AIDS victims; 76% of Women 
and 92% of Children Afflicted with AIDS are located in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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power across countries. If patent protection further increases prices then the application of TRIPS 
provisions will only exacerbate the already delicate situation of developing countries. Oxfam (2001) 
provides some anecdotal evidence on the impact of patent protection on access to drugs for the case of 
Brazil and treatment of HIV/AIDS. They suggest that under a government funded programme, the 
cost of providing anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs in Brazil amounted to $3,000 per patient per year. This 
because 10 of the 12 key drugs needed for treatment were produced as generics. In contrast the cost in 
the USA was seen to be of $10,000 per patient per year. The large discrepancy between these highlights 
the problem of prohibitive prices on developing countries. It also points to another constraint that 
countries face in accessing needed drugs and this has to do with budgetary shortfalls in implementing 
health programmes aimed at citizens. These can be captured rehashing the Brazil example. In Oxfam’s 
(2001) example the government backed AVR drugs campaign targeted 95,000 patients who benefited 
from treatment. If we apply the US prices to this programme as a counterfactual of what Brazil would 
have had to pay in the presence of patents and assume the same budget allocation, one would see the 
amount of possible treated patients fall to 28,500 (Just 30% of the treated patients with generics). 
Hence one can see how countries that are more severely budget constrained than Brazil and have just 
as great an incidence of disease can face important challenges in meeting health outcomes with more 
expensive drugs due to patents. MSF (2005) also provide compelling evidence on the link between 
patents and the cost of pharmaceuticals for the case of India. They suggest that the creation of a 
competitive generics market in India reduced the cost of AVR treatment by 83% leading them to 
suggest that “generic competition has shown to be the most effective means of lowering medicines price”.  
It is however worthwhile noting that the above examples serve illustrative purposes only and are 
generally applicable to countries that have the productive capacity to engage in the manufacture of 
generics. This is relevant to middle income countries but does not hold for those countries in the 
lower spectrum of the income scale. Whilst Maskus (2000) advocates that ‘imitation’ can lead to the 
development of local capacity, the removal of patent provisions is possibly a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a reduction of prices from the use of domestic generic products. The human 
capital needed for such production tends to demand the use of high quality practitioners, factors that 
are in short supply in least developed countries. Access to pharmaceuticals then needs to be ensured 
by the international trading system for those countries that most need it. The removal of patent 
provisions coupled with an explicit system that deals with the supply of generics across countries 
would serve this purpose. This then suggests that domestic productive capacity should also play a role 
in determining the desirability of implementing TRIPS provisions failing such a system. 
4.2 Capacity constraints 
One key factoid that is often cited in the literature refers to the large share of costs that 
pharmaceuticals occupy in total health expenditure (66% according to Watal 2000). Countries that are 
already constrained in their budgets will become more so should patent protection increase the price 
of pharmaceuticals as Hoen (2002) suggests. Inappropriate or insufficient tax collection mechanism, 
the over-reliance of budget revenue on import duties where these are being reduced due to reciprocal 
bilateral trade deals (i.e. the EPAs) only exacerbates an already precarious budgetary condition. One 
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then need consider several indicators as measures of budgetary constraints. One key indicator to serve 
this purpose can be the per capita share of government revenue. This will identify possible general 
budgetary constraints, but it need be complemented with an indicator on expenditure on health 
systems. Here one may look at per capita government spending on health and per capita total 
spending on health. These combined indicators may give us a metric of the cross-sectional short fall in 
meeting demand for health outcomes. 
Adding to the constraints that countries may face as a result of more expensive pharmaceuticals are 
the expenses that are incurred as a result of transposing TRIPS commitments into national legislation. 
Lybbert (2002) refers to these costs as the direct costs of implementation where these capture the costs 
of creating the appropriate legal infrastructure; administrative capacity; and enforcement 
mechanisms. These direct costs are to be added to the indirect costs which occur when more patents 
are called for as a result of stronger enforcement mechanisms. Given that the innovation process is 
largely located in developing countries, the World Bank (2001) estimates that the indirect costs alone 
could cost poor countries above $20 billion in transfers to developed countries. But there is a third 
type of cost that is hardly mentioned in the literature and which relates to the opportunity cost that is 
implicit from the direct cost. Devoting resources to TRIPs implementation clearly requires, in the 
presence of limited resources, not devoting funds to other activities which could provide far reaching 
benefits to developing countries (i.e. infrastructure projects, hospitals or further investment in 
education). Whilst these opportunity costs are hard to gauge they are likely to be important, 
particularly when it has been established that the benefits from patent protection largely accrue to 
developed country firms. Government spending on TRIPS implementation can then be seen as a cash 
transfer from developing to developed countries as the World Bank (2001) suggests.  
4.3 Incidence of Disease   
The aforementioned access and capacity constraints need be weighed against the degree of incidence 
of disease in developing countries. There is little added value in enumerating the severity of health 
problems in developing countries. But whilst most studies focus their attention on the incidence of 
targeted diseases such as HIV, Malaria and Tuberculosis, it is worthwhile noting that these are not the 
only diseases that plague Developing Countries. Many other common diseases have an equally high 
incidence and devastating impact. These can generally be easily treated with available 
pharmaceuticals. The problem of access to pharmaceuticals and capacity to deal with health 
emergencies are direct functions of the incidence of disease by country. One should thus introduce 
indicators of incidence of disease as factors that determine the modulation of WTO commitments 
under the primer that countries that suffer most should receive more consideration. These indicators 
can be easily ranked on a per-capita basis for cross-country comparisons which may help us gauge the 
relative severity of health outcomes.   
5. Capturing the Constraints using Analytical Criteria    
To operationalise the threshold approach to derogations from TRIPs commitments for the 
pharmaceutical sectors one need use a set of analytical criteria that serve to identify the constraints 
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that countries face as a result of or in the process of implementation. Some important and overarching 
limitations need be noted. Firstly, there will invariably be a mismatch between the analytical criteria 
used and the actual constraint identified owing to the fact that the analytical criteria will at best be a 
proxy for a given constraint. This then requires finding an appropriate methodology that combines a 
set of indicators, the choice of which will need take on board a set of assumptions and/or a weighting 
structure. Taking an econometric approach or even one relying on a weighting structure will come 
with its methodological shortcomings providing the second limitation. Stevens (2002) used very 
simple rankings for the purpose of differentiation but was limited by a coherent method that 
combined his identified indicators. Another important challenge will come when choosing the 
implicit threshold. Placing the graduating threshold will need be carefully considered. Objectivity 
would be preferred to facilitate the process however one cannot rule out the possibility of negotiating 
the thresholds. The last, and perhaps the most prescient problem relates to data availability. This is 
particularly important for the implementation of a targeted differentiation strategy and more so when 
this is for a very specific sector of the economy such as pharmaceuticals. Gaps in data will affect the 
unified approach to ranking countries according to constraints based on analytical criteria and may in 
turn severely jeopardise the approach. This is because lack of data for a given country will result in its 
elimination from the sample and hence the SDT approach will not be implementable for that country. 
One need then find appropriate treatment for the countries where data is unavailable. 
Bearing these in mind, we concern ourselves presently with an exposition of the identification, by 
means of analytical criteria, of the countries that may be constrained in their implementation of 
TRIPS provisions according to the four main identified constraints. We begin with a summary table of 
these and a suggestion of the indicators that can be used. The table follows from the discussion in the 
previous section but proposes a further disaggregation of the issues that the indicators try to capture. 
Hence taking the first ‘Economic’ constraints we see that the main issues identified in the literature 
relate to looking at the benefits; the size and competitiveness of the pharmaceutical market; and the 
possible negative impact on third parties that derogations from WTO provisions may generate. We 
look at what these indicators tell us with regards to preliminary groupings that may be exempt from 
provisions to later develop an approach that combines these in a way that will aid us with the selection 
procedure. We will rely on readily available databases such as the World Development Indicators; 
trade figures from COMTRADE; and the DALY.   
Table 1: Summary of Constraints and Possible Indicators 
Constraint Issue Possible Indicators 
Benefits 
- R&D / GDP capturing the gains derived from IPR 
protection (World Bank 2001) 
- Concentration of Production and/or trade 
Competitiveness Revealed Comparative Advantage or trade balance to 
capture Cottier’s (2006) propositions 
size of Pharmaceutical 
market Share of pharmaceuticals in total trade 
Economic 
Impact of non-compliance 
of third countries Share of world GDP capturing market size 
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Purchasing Power GDP per capita 
Access to 
Pharmaceuticals Productive capacity (X-M)/(X+M) gauges the trade balance and hence 
possibly the dependence on imported pharmaceuticals 
Per capita budget revenue to capture government 
budget shortfalls in meeting Health outcomes  
National expenditure on Health  (Both private and 
public) 
Capacity 
Constraints Costs 
Population (Watal 2000) 
Incidence of diseases (DALY database)  Incidence of 
Disease comparative spread of illness Created indicator RDI (Revealed Death Incidence, like 
RCA but on death figures) 
 
5.1 Economic Constraints and distribution of pharmaceutical production 
As the World Bank (2001) and Deardorff (1992) suggest, the economic benefits of patent protection 
will be reaped by the countries that produce products with a high content of IPR. Enforcement of 
patents can then translate into a cash transfer from countries that do not produce these products to 
those that do. This means that the enforcement of patent protection has important distributional 
consequences. The extent to which these occur can be broadly gauged through the underlying trade 
flows. Table 2 shows the flow of pharmaceutical products between and within developed and 
developing countries25.The concentration is evident where almost 88% of pharmaceuticals exports 
originate from developed countries, leaving the remaining 12% to developing countries. Where 
imports are concerned, the distribution is a little less concentrated with more than 68% of these 
flowing towards developed countries.  The table further shows that around 70% of developed country 
exports are destined towards other developed countries. Here we might be witnessing a high degree of 
intra-industry or intra-firm trade in the form of non-retailed pharmaceutical products exported from 
one country to be used in the production of retail pharmaceuticals in another country. This 
phenomenon is also seen in the origin of Developed country imports, where almost 86% of imports 
originate from other developed countries. But these instances may be equally revealing of differences 
in demand structure between developed and developing countries. Where exports are concerned, 
developing countries tend to have a more balanced geographical distribution in terms of destination; 
the table shows that almost 50% of exports are destined to other developing countries. One marked 
result is that of a large share of developing country imports originating from developed countries. 
Whilst this is unsurprising it does reveal an important distinction between developed and developing 
countries placing the latter as important consumers of pharmaceutical products from the former. This 
then suggests that we are not far off the theoretical model that Deardorff (1992) exposes which again 
lends support to his conclusion pointing to a possible case for a geographical limitation of patenting 
provisions. 
Table 2. 2008 Pharmaceuticals trade (in millions of USD)  
  Exports Imports 
                                                            
25 As defined by code 54 on SITC rev. 3 it includes pharmaceuticals and non retail chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
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Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries Total 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries Total 
Developed Countries 149,888.98 62,274.89 212,163.87 146,998.61 24,380.58 171,379.19 
Developing Countries 14,245.09 15,316.46 29,561.55 61,565.22 17,141.56 78,706.78 
Percentages 
Developed Countries 70.65 29.35 87.77 85.77 14.23 68.53 
Developing Countries 48.19 51.81 12.23 78.22 21.78 31.47 
Source: UN Comtrade 
Note: Total imports and Total exports do not match due to missing data. 
 
Looking at more geographically disaggregated data in a selection of countries shows that, even within 
Developed Countries, there is concentration taking place. Excluding Intra-EU trade, the European 
Union accounts around 53% of Developed Country exports and 46% of total World pharmaceutical 
exports. This makes the EU, by a large margin, the largest exporter of pharmaceuticals. However, the 
role of Switzerland in total pharmaceutical exports is also noteworthy and stands at nearly 18% of total 
world pharmaceutical exports. Table 3, which is ranked according to the size of total exports, 
highlights the international presence of some important developing countries. China accounts for 
3.35% of total pharmaceuticals exports. Together with India, they are the largest net exporters of 
pharmaceuticals among Developing Countries. But other countries also emerge such as Israel, Mexico, 
Brazil, Korea, and Argentina. To the extent that these countries may have reached international 
competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry one could consider, on the basis of Cottier’s (2006) 
argument, that TRIPs provisions would need apply. When looking at imports, Table 3 reveals that 
these Developing countries also attract large quantities of pharmaceutical imports. With the exception 
of China and India, almost all Developing countries are net importers of pharmaceuticals which may 
suggest that for these countries international competitiveness has not yet been attained26. The Table 
then suggests that one need carefully look at both China and India to determine the extent of their 
competitiveness in international markets. These countries will also be important because they have 
growing incomes per capita and have a huge population hence derogations from TRIPs commitments 
may incur important impacts on third country producers of pharmaceuticals. These negative third 
country impacts can be grasped by either looking at the size of a given country’s GDP with respect to 
world GDP or alternatively the share of total world population they occupy. The larger this number is, 
the higher the impact of derogations for producers of pharmaceuticals the rest of the world. 
Table 3. 2008 Pharmaceutical trade by country (In millions of USD) 
  Exports Imports 
  
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries Total 
% of 
total 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries Total 
% of 
total 
European Union     67,940.71      44,051.49    111,992.21     46.33      48,040.83      11,888.65      59,929.48  23.96 
Switzerland     34,518.58        9,626.77      44,145.34     18.26      17,575.17          202.51      17,777.67  7.11 
United States     32,435.60        4,782.20      37,217.80     15.40      49,955.44        9,912.74      59,868.18  23.94 
China       4,666.64        3,424.26        8,090.90       3.35        5,007.76          519.10        5,526.86  2.21 
Canada       5,582.21          328.81        5,911.02       2.45      10,393.96          785.84      11,179.80  4.47 
India       2,307.66        3,515.09        5,822.75       2.41        1,058.28          811.29        1,869.56  0.75 
                                                            
26 The Rest of the World, composed entirely of Developing Countries, account for around 11% of total pharmaceutical 
imports. 
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  Exports Imports 
  
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries Total 
% of 
total 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries Total 
% of 
total 
Singapore       4,044.13          926.62        4,970.75       2.06        1,576.06          331.24        1,907.30  0.76 
Israel       4,651.72          190.29        4,842.01       2.00        1,309.58            60.20        1,369.78  0.55 
Japan       2,899.17          763.49        3,662.66       1.52      10,227.32          771.19      10,998.52  4.40 
Australia       1,641.79        1,706.87        3,348.66       1.39        6,667.49          393.71        7,061.20  2.82 
Mexico         395.02        1,080.28        1,475.30       0.61        4,050.25          554.99        4,605.25  1.84 
Brazil         332.62          718.16        1,050.78       0.43        4,163.55          807.60        4,971.15  1.99 
Korea Rep.         385.43          630.15        1,015.58       0.42        2,988.83          451.18        3,440.00  1.38 
Norway         658.90            48.25          707.15       0.29        1,796.12            29.82        1,825.93  0.73 
Argentina         146.06          539.80          685.85       0.28        1,052.85          259.50        1,312.35  0.52 
Jordan           19.04          478.47          497.51       0.21          372.43            79.31          451.75  0.18 
Turkey         257.12          212.11          469.24       0.19        4,425.96          312.49        4,738.45  1.89 
Bulgaria           54.54          330.17          384.71       0.16          727.61            87.44          815.05  0.33 
Colombia           15.56          356.89          372.45       0.15          837.49          374.70        1,212.20  0.48 
Costa Rica         122.04          204.65          326.69       0.14          321.40          210.31          531.71  0.21 
Russian Federation           35.10          287.67          322.77       0.13        7,429.18        1,767.62        9,196.81  3.68 
Croatia         153.91          167.53          321.44       0.13          682.51          126.28          808.80  0.32 
Thailand           78.73          212.52          291.25       0.12        1,170.41          271.46        1,441.88  0.58 
Hong Kong           11.15          251.04          262.19       0.11        1,434.69          326.97        1,761.66  0.70 
Romania           74.64          161.21          235.84       0.10        2,354.04          295.35        2,649.39  1.06 
Indonesia           75.86          154.21          230.07       0.10          372.81          181.19          554.00  0.22 
Serbia           18.52          190.95          209.47       0.09          564.05          143.69          707.74  0.28 
New Zealand         167.90            40.39          208.28       0.09          766.21            64.89          831.10  0.33 
South Africa           46.24          149.97          196.21       0.08        1,387.30          277.34        1,664.65  0.67 
Syria             1.36          193.20          194.56       0.08            75.72            74.95          150.67  0.06 
Rest of World         396.13        1,867.85        2,263.98       0.94      19,778.49        9,148.58      28,927.08  11.57 
Total   164,134.07      77,591.34    241,725.42   100.00    208,563.83      41,522.15    250,085.98  100.00 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
5.2 Access to pharmaceuticals  
Country access to key pharmaceuticals is likely to depend on the purchasing power and on the 
capacity to source these either domestically or from sources abroad. The key variable, in addition to 
purchasing power is thus the price of said pharmaceuticals, however these prices are not readily 
available hence other means need be used to gauge the access problems that countries face27. Here we 
consider the extent of domestic production capabilities and in the process the distribution of domestic 
consumption across national or international sources. This allows us to determine not only the 
exposure of countries to pharmaceutical imports and the domestic capacity of producing these, but 
also the domestic competitive climate28. Looking at this for a selection of countries due to data 
availability constraints, Table 4 highlights some interesting observations. The first is that the larger the 
country (in terms of its GDP), the smaller is the share of imports in the supply of demand. For 
example, the US and the European Union supply their respective domestic demands with around 30% 
of imports. Developed countries tend to show comparable shares. As a corollary, developing countries 
                                                            
27 Extensive country surveys can serve the purpose of gauging prices but these are inpractical in the context of our 
investigation. 
28 Unfortunately, the availability of production data is limited which impedes a more comprehensive treatment on 
production and domestic consumption of pharmaceuticals 
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have a larger dependence on international sources for pharmaceutical product consumption.  
However the case of China and India stand at odds with the general observations. They exhibit strong 
domestic production and little reliance on imported pharmaceuticals to satisfy implicit domestic 
consumption; shares of 10% and 16% respectively lend support to this point. The case of Mexico is 
somewhat similar but to a lesser extent29.. In light of these figures one could argue that where there is 
strong domestic pharmaceutical production there might be a case for the enforcement of patenting 
rights. Cottier (2006) is of this view where he suggests that one need consider not only international 
competitiveness, but also the domestic competitive environment and the interplay between domestic 
and foreign sources for pharmaceuticals.   
Table 4. 2005 Pharmaceuticals balance by country (In millions of USD) 
  Production Exports Imports 
Calculated 
Consumption 
% Imports 
/consumption 
Australia        4,376,789      2,463,125        7,061,204         8,974,868                       78.7  
Bulgaria            304,295         124,063            815,051           995,283                       81.9  
Chile            746,249            66,968           720,360        1,399,641                       51.5  
China      51,870,686      3,777,728        5,526,864       53,619,822                       10.3  
Colombia        1,263,427         263,801        1,212,195         2,211,821                       54.8  
Ecuador            170,758            32,350           688,919           827,326                       83.3  
Ethiopia              19,613                 203           222,551           241,960                       92.0  
European Union 25    208,249,937   72,349,786     59,929,485     195,829,635                       30.6  
Georgia                 7,920             4,233           213,875            217,562                       98.3  
India      12,489,478      2,761,837        1,869,563       11,597,204                       16.1  
Indonesia        2,074,988         112,364           553,996         2,516,619                       22.0  
Japan      70,016,114     3,327,426     10,998,516       77,687,204                       14.2  
Jordan            362,494         274,763            451,745           539,476                       83.7  
Malaysia            320,827         134,827            929,207        1,115,207                       83.3  
Mexico      11,516,814      1,403,237        4,605,249       14,718,826                       31.3  
Morocco            544,613            33,371           460,485           971,726                       47.4  
Norway        1,155,607         533,152        1,825,934         2,448,390                       74.6  
Panama              31,547            15,193           270,976           287,330                       94.3  
Peru            413,729            17,091           458,165           854,802                       53.6  
Romania            470,544            41,956       2,649,394         3,077,982                       86.1  
Russian Federation        2,275,424         201,089        9,196,808       11,271,143                       81.6  
Turkey        4,370,850         316,712        4,738,448         8,792,586                       53.9  
United States of America    165,969,000    25,159,579      59,868,182     200,677,603                       29.8  
Source: United Nations UNIDO 
Note: Mexico and Japan data from OECD Stan database. 
 
Cottier (2006) suggests that the nature of the WTO can be subsumed into a regulation of the 
competitive environment between domestic and imported products and hence forms of SDT or 
graduating constraints should be contingent on competitive shortfalls where commitments kick in 
after international competitiveness is attained30. This proposition hinges on identifying international 
competitiveness where the obvious candidate for such measure is the revealed comparative advantage 
                                                            
29 The lack of data for Brazil and Korea, as well as other countries, is limiting 
30 This principle is similar to that applied to graduation in the GSP of the EU where competitiveness is related to market 
shares and preferences are removed when a market share threshold is breached. 
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of a country in pharmaceutical products. However disentangling the domestic and foreign component 
of pharmaceutical demand is hard due to the lack of appropriate domestic production data. One can 
however use certain trade metrics to gauge the possible domestic competitive environment. We 
propose the use of an indicator motivated by the intra-industry trade literature where we capture the 
share of the trade balance in pharmaceuticals as a proportion of the total trade of these.  
Normalised Trade Balance  
Where X and M identify exports and imports respectively, k is the sector under analysis (the 
pharmaceutical sector) and i is the country under investigation. The indicator serves identify the 
reliance on either imported or exported pharmaceuticals as a measure of competitiveness. If a country 
only imports these products then the expression will tend to minus one. On the other hand if the 
country in question only exports these products, then the expression tends to plus one. The 
presumption here is that competitiveness should be captured by way of a positive balance of trade in 
pharmaceuticals31. To the extent that some richer developing countries have developed a strong 
domestic pharmaceutical industry, as Watan (2000) and Nogues (1993) show for India and Argentina 
respectively, Cottier’s (2006) proposition gains prominence. Domestic competitiveness in these 
countries has lead to increasing competitiveness in international markets and hence international 
commitments should kick-in accordingly.  
5.3 Government Capacity Constraints 
Budgetary constraints in developing countries pose a serious threat to dealing with important health 
outcomes. Table 5 presents the average total per capita expenditure and the public per capita 
expenditure on health in different regions of the world. The disparity in the health expenditure, both 
public and total, is clear.. On average, Developed Countries spend 19 times more on health care than 
the Sub-Saharan Africa grouping. If we consider public expenditure, the difference becomes more 
marked; Developed country governments spend 25 times more than their developing counterparts. 
These figures hide a big dispersion. In Ethiopia, for example, the total per capita health expenditure is 
of around $30 while in the United States this figure is in the order of $7500; 250 times more. It is clear 
that some of the differences in per capita expenditure in health can be explained by levels of income in 
addition to the heterogeneity of the groupings, but it points to one of the main constraints that 
Developing and LDCs have in dealing with health issues. Either private or public expenditure on 
health are extremely low and this explains part of the high incidence of diseases that can be easily 
treated with medicines (as seen in Table 6)32.   
                                                            
31 One would also want to include a measure of market concentration to gauge the competitive environment in the country 
in question as Cottier (2006) suggest. Fair competition amongst foreign firms operating in the domestic economy can be 
jeopardised through patent infringement of these and hence need be tamed. One can capture the degree of competition in a 
given market by way of a herfindahl indicator that is commonly used in the competition law literature. However its 
computation requires data on the presence of domestic and foreign firms in these markets which is not readily available. 
32 One need bear in mind that other factors such as education, or lack of sanitation which serve preventative roles also affect 
the high incidence of disease. 
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Expenditure on medicines constitutes the largest share of total health spending in developing 
countries. Watal (2000) points out that it could represent almost 2/3 of total health expenditure where 
much of this is out-of-pocket given the weakness of public health services hence being a contributor to 
impoverishment. But the regional figures we present do not reveal such large out of pocket 
expenditures as Watal suggests. Whilst in Developed Countries 75% of the health care is financed by 
the Government, this figure falls to 57% in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, when we look at country 
data, we find evidence of a wide ranging distribution with the likes of Nigerian government 
expenditure taking 24% of the total health bill. Nevertheless, the situation is not better when the 
Government finances a large share of health expenditure since medicines take a large part of this 
expenditure. Collins-Chase (2008) cite evidence where the yearly wholesale price for an antiretroviral 
treatment in South Africa ranges from $750 for public procurement to $2000 when sold to private 
person. It is clear, from the figures presented in table 5, that medicines are unaffordable at current 
levels of health care expenditure. Moreover, not only can medicines represent a large share of the total 
health expenditure, it could also be a heavy burden for the economy as a whole. Collins-Chase, for 
example, highlights that the cost of AIDS treatments has taken 3.8% of GDP in Lesotho. 
Table 5. Average expenditure per capita on health 2008. (USD PPP) 
  Per capita Government Per capita total 
Developed Countries 2,339 3,118 
Western Asia 669 1,101 
Caribbean 503 830 
South-eastern Europe 472 769 
Latin America 351 608 
Eastern Asia 320 570 
South-eastern Asia 217 423 
Oceania 323 374 
CIS 203 371 
Northern Africa 209 358 
Southern Asia 123 233 
Sub-Saharan Africa 93 163 
Source: Own elaboration based on WHO  
Adding to the heavy burden on public health care systems, an epidemic, such as AIDS or Malaria, can 
have wide ranging implications for developing countries. Indeed, the instance of these attenuating 
circumstances is clearly made reference to in the use of compulsory licenses within the TRIPs 
agreement. Increases in mortality and morbidity affect households, the private sector and the 
Government. The economic impacts of AIDS, for example, translates into a reduction of the 
household saving rate as these use more income on medical assistance (Collin-Chase). This then has 
important implications on future growth rates. Freire (2004) finds a fall of 18% in the savings rate as a 
consequence of the epidemic. In addition, and where saving capacity is low such as in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, households may need to reduce expenditure on other vital products. Arndt and Lewis (2001) 
show that AIDS increases the health expenditure to 10-15% of total expenditure, at the expense of 
other non-food expenditures.  
5.4 Capturing Incidence of Disease across countries 
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The incidence of death can serve identify the severity of health outcomes across countries. Table 6 
presents figures across regional groupings in share format using the Death and disability adjusted life 
year (DALY) database by region. The DALY is a measure of the burden of a disease measured as years 
lost due to illness, disability or early death and it is calculated by the World Health Organisation. 
Taking the aggregate shares; infectious and parasitic diseases (IPDs) is the highest cause of death with 
a 19.8% incidence; followed by Neuropsychiatric disorders (13.1 %); and Cardiovascular diseases 
(9.9%). This table is useful in that it captures more than deaths from diseases by including injuries 
ranging from traffic accidents, suicides and wars. Moreover, it delimits deaths related with nutritional 
and other living conditions. The Table also reports a revealed incidence indicator (RII) which is 
motivated by Balassa’s (1966) revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indicator. It compares the share 
of outcomes from a given condition in a region to that of the world. Values above 1 (marked with gray 
shading) then indicate regional outcomes from a given condition that are above world averages. 
Looking at this regional distribution some marked differences between regions emerge. For example, 
the incidence of IPDs is Developed countries is very low (RDI of 0.1) whereas  in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Oceania is relatively high (RDI of 2.14 and 1.23 respectively). These differences reflect more than 
discrepancies in levels of development as they are also the result of geographical location where the 
incidence of tropical diseases such as Malaria is higher. Certain similarities are also worthwhile noting 
too, Neuropsychiatric disorders have similar incidences across most regional groupings such as; 
Developed countries; Latin America; Eastern Asia; and Northern Africa33. This leads to an important 
point originally remarked by Lanjouw (2001). He suggests that diseases can be categorised into those 
that predominantly affect developing countries, those that affect the developed world and those that 
affect both. The implications of this are important for the identification of groups of countries who 
should benefit from a modulation of WTO commitments as it gives us a first step in identifying 
countries by shared similarities but dissimilarities with other groupings (Stevens 2002). In the case of 
incidence of disease it makes sense to classify countries according to similar incidences of disease.  
It is clear that infectious and parasitic diseases are the main cause of death and disability in the 
developing World. However, the Table also reveals the importance of other treatable diseases or 
conditions where medicines play a key, albeit not unique role, in their treatment. For example, in 
Southern Asia, 11.7% and 9.2% of the DALYs are due to Neuropsychiatric Disorders and 
Cardiovascular Diseases. These match the incidence of infectious diseases in this region. The 
incidence of these two causes combined is greater than infectious diseases in South-east Asia. The 
treatment of these diseases requires medicines that may also be hard to afford for impoverished 
households. But medicines are not the sole treatment to these conditions and the quality and quantity 
of medical services are also likely to play a determinant position.. But to the extent that they play a 
central role in the treatment of some of these diseases the reduced access to these due to high prices 
may play a key role in the high numbers above reported. This then suggests that just taking IPDs as 
sole indicator of health concerns as is regularly done in the literature may provide misleading results.  
                                                            
33 Some of these conditions, it is important to remark, are more related to the person lifestyle such as alcoholism. 
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Table. 6. 2004 DALY and Revealed Incidence Indicator (RII) by cause and region 
  
D
ev
elo
pe
d 
So
ut
h-
ea
ste
rn
 
Eu
ro
pe
 
CI
S 
N
or
th
er
n 
A
fri
ca
 
Su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n 
A
fri
ca
 
Ca
rib
be
an
 
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a 
Ea
ste
rn
 A
sia
 
So
ut
he
rn
 A
sia
 
So
ut
h-
ea
ste
rn
 A
sia
 
W
es
te
rn
 A
sia
 
O
ce
an
ia
 
To
ta
l 
2% 2.1% 6% 8.6% 42.3% 16.7% 7.9% 6.2% 19.1% 16.5% 8% 24.37% Infectous and 
parasitic diseases 0.10 0.11 0.30 0.43 2.14 0.84 0.40 0.31 0.96 0.83 0.40 1.23 
19.8% 
1.1% 1.5% 2.6% 4.2% 11.4% 5.1% 3.4% 1.9% 7.7% 4.7% 5.5% 5.6% Respiratory infections 
0.17 0.23 0.41 0.66 1.78 0.80 0.53 0.30 1.20 0.73 0.86 0.88 
6.4% 
0.5% 0.4% 0.7% 2.9% 3.9% 2.5% 1.9% 0.9% 3.1% 2.9% 2% 3.6% Maternal conditions 
0.19 0.15 0.27 1.12 1.50 0.96 0.73 0.35 1.19 1.12 0.77 1.38 
2.6% 
1.2% 1.9% 3.1% 9.1% 10% 6.4% 5.7% 5.4% 12% 6.2% 10.8% 10.3% Perinatal conditions 
0.14 0.23 0.37 1.10 1.20 0.77 0.69 0.65 1.45 0.75 1.30 1.24 
8.3% 
0.6% 1.3% 1.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3% 2.1% 1.6% 3.2% 2.7% 3.6% 6.4% Nutritional 
Deficiencis 0.24 0.52 0.56 1.08 1.24 1.20 0.84 0.64 1.28 1.08 1.44 2.56 
2.5% 
15.3% 12.4% 7.3% 4.1% 1.6% 5.1% 6% 9.6% 2.8% 4.7% 4.4% 3% Malignant Neoplasms 
3.00 2.43 1.43 0.80 0.31 1.00 1.18 1.88 0.55 0.92 0.86 0.59 
5.1% 
0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% Other neoplasms 
3.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
0.1% 
2.8% 2% 1% 1.5% 0.6% 2.7% 2.7% 1.6% 0.9% 1.9% 1.4% 1.4% Diabetes mellitus 
2.15 1.54 0.77 1.15 0.46 2.08 2.08 1.23 0.69 1.46 1.08 1.08 
1.3% 
1.5% 0.6% 0.6% 1.2% 0.8% 1.7% 1.7% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% Nutritional/endocrine 
disorders 2.14 0.86 0.86 1.71 1.14 2.43 2.43 0.86 0.14 0.86 1.14 1.14 
0.7% 
25.7% 18.4% 14.5% 16.7% 5.1% 16.5% 21.8% 18.5% 11.7% 13.3% 12.8% 10.1% Neuropsychiatric 
disorders 1.96 1.40 1.11 1.27 0.39 1.26 1.66 1.41 0.89 1.02 0.98 0.77 
13.1% 
7.1% 5.8% 4% 8.8% 2.4% 4.5% 4.9% 10.3% 6% 7.2% 4.4% 3.1% Sense organ disorders 
1.25 1.02 0.70 1.54 0.42 0.79 0.86 1.81 1.05 1.26 0.77 0.54 
5.7% 
15.8% 30. 3% 27.1% 14% 3.8% 9.9% 9.1% 12.2% 9.2% 9.9% 12.3% 9.2% Cardiovascular 
diseases 1.60 3.06 2.74 1.41 0.38 1.00 0.92 1.23 0.93 1.00 1.24 0.93 
9.9% 
5.9% 2.5% 2.4% 3.7% 1.9% 3.6% 5% 7.4% 3.4% 4% 3.5% 2.7% Respiratory diseases 
1.51 0.64 0.62 0.95 0.49 0.92 1.28 1.90 0.87 1.03 0.90 0.69 
3.9% 
4% 4.4% 4.8% 4% 1.5% 2.9% 3.8% 3.2% 2.8% 3% 2.3% 3.1% Digestive diseases 
1.43 1.57 1.71 1.43 0.54 1.04 1.36 1.14 1.00 1.07 0.82 1.11 
2.8% 
1% 0.9% 0.8% 1.9% 0.6% 0.9% 1.3% 1.3% 0.9% 1.3% 1.5% 1.2% Diseases of the 
genitourinary system 1.00 0.90 0.80 1.90 0.60 0.90 1.30 1.30 0.90 1.30 1.50 1.20 
1% 
0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% Skin diseases 
0.67 0.67 1.00 1.33 0.67 1.33 1.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.67 1.67 
0.3% 
4.4% 4.4% 2.7% 2.2% 0.6% 2.3% 2.6% 3.6% 1.5% 2.4% 2% 2.7% Musculoskeletal 
diseases 2.20 2.20 1.35 1.10 0.30 1.15 1.30 1.80 0.75 1.20 1.00 1.35 
2% 
1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 2.5% 1.5% 1.6% 2.4% 1.2% 2% 1.3% 2.5% 2.4% Congenital 
abnormalities 0.71 0.65 0.82 1.47 0.88 0.94 1.41 0.71 1.18 0.76 1.47 1.41 
1.7% 
0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1% 0.2% 1.1% 1.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.4% Oral diseases 
1.40 1.40 1.00 2.00 0.40 2.20 2.60 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 0.80 
0.5% 
6% 6.8% 13.5% 8.5% 5.5% 9.1% 8% 11% 10.3% 13.2% 13.8% 6.7% Unintentional 
injuries 0.66 0.75 1.48 0.93 0.60 1.00 0.88 1.21 1.13 1.45 1.52 0.74 
9.1% 
2.9% 2.3% 5.2% 1.4% 2.9% 4% 7.8% 2.6% 2.4% 2.8% 7.3% 2.4% Intentional injuries 
0.91 0.72 1.63 0.44 0.91 1.25 2.44 0.81 0.75 0.88 2.28 0.75 
3.2% 
Total DALY (in 000)  121 
268  8 503 
 70 
778 
 25 
946 
 391 
416  8 708 
 90 
380 
 212 
323 
 428 
842 
 119 
885 
 42 
980  2 221 
1 523 
248 
Source: Own elaboration based on WHO 
In Table 7 we present DALY rates by regional groups for a more disaggregated selection of the 
infectious and parasitic diseases (IPDs). This gives us a more comprehensive picture of the causes of 
death and disability that affect the poorest countries in the World. To give a sense of the real 
magnitude and quantity of years of life lost to these diseases we report absolute figures. From the table 
we see that the highest incidence of death occurs in the Sub-Saharan African region followed by 
Southern Asia and then South-eastern Asia. Among the IPDs, Diarrhoeal is the cause with the largest 
death incidence followed by HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria. But to the extent that the treatment of 
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Diarrhoeal diseases relies less on access to drugs and more on sanitation or rehydration therapy34 one 
can infer that the impact of patents on this sector may be much reduced. Nevertheless, other 
infectious diseases such as HIV, Tuberculosis, Malaria and other Tropical diseases do require specific 
drugs that may be subject to patents.  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa is noteworthy. Around two thirds of the incidence of 
this disease is in countries located in this region35. The case of Malaria is even more marked in this 
region but this may be driven by the specific geographical and climatic conditions which also need be 
taken into account. Where Tuberculosis is concerned, incidence is more widespread, again skewed 
towards Sub-Saharan Africa but also Southern Asia. This disease is one of particular interest as it is 
easily preventable with access to an appropriate vaccine (this in contrast with Malaria and HIV which 
have no such cures). This implies that a more effective way of preventing this disease should be 
possible by way of granting affordable access to this vaccine. But one must also consider broader 
issues of access beyond patenting which relate to distribution. This point then highlights the 
importance of access to adequate health care which may be beyond the realm of the provision of 
affordable medicines. To the extent that the TRIPs agreement recognises cases of national 
emergencies for compulsory licence provisions, the use of the DALY to capture these instances can be 
supported.    
Table. 7. 2004 DALY (in millions) in Infectious and parasitic diseases by region 
  
 
Tuberculosis  
 
Malaria  
 
HIV/AIDS 
 Diarrhoeal 
diseases  
 Childhood-
cluster 
diseases  
 Tropical 
cluster 
diseases  
 
Meningitis  
 Other 
Infectuos 
and 
parasitic 
diseases  
 
TOTAL 
 Developed  122 2 600 283 50 1 62 416 1,536 
 South-
eastern 
Europe  65 0 15 22 3 0 2 27 135 
 CIS  1,525 3 951 976 19 6 79 306 3,865 
 Northern 
Africa  140 45 70 845 129 27 76 484 1,815 
 Sub-
Saharan 
Africa  11,465 32,202 47,358 33,272 13,546 6,415 380 6,373 151,012 
 Caribbean  134 16 436 303 102 13 30 144 1,178 
 Latin 
America  751 74 1,350 2,174 133 519 59 850 5,910 
 Eastern 
Asia  3,859 27 679 3,921 557 9 393 1,891 11,337 
 Southern 
Asia  10,977 928 4,044 25,398 13,773 4,598 692 7,102 67,512 
 South-
eastern 
Asia  4,864 528 2,952 3,629 1,597 471 207 2,351 16,599 
 Western 
Asia  251 45 29 1,833 271 37 82 345 2,893 
Source: WHO 
                                                            
34 UNICEF/WHO 2009 « Diarrhoea: Why children are still dying and what can be done” 
35 . We present in the annex, for further reference, the information in this table disaggregated by country 
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Notes: Other infectious and parasitic diseases includes Hepatitis, STDs excluding HIV, dengue, leprosy and intestinal nematode infections.  
6. Combining the Analytical Criteria into a Composite Indicator 
The indicators exposed in the previous section served the purpose of underlining the heterogeneity in 
the constraints that countries face in their application of patenting provisions for pharmaceuticals 
under the TRIPS agreement. Operationalising the application of SDT according to these constraints 
requires combining these indicators into a composite measure. We employ a composite indicator 
approach which aggregates ranked criteria according to a weighted structure and discuss both the 
methodological implications and the possible role of negotiations in shaping the selection of both the 
weights and the thresholds. We choose composite indicators because they serve as a good tool for 
summarising and combining data that come in different units. Additionally, using an aggregating 
technique that relies on rankings is useful because it is in the relative standing of countries in the 
constraints they face that we are ultimately interested in for the creation of an exclusion list. 
Alternative approaches involve the use of econometrics and one such study that uses econometric 
techniques to identify vulnerable countries is by the Commonwealth Secretariat (1999). They use a 
two-step estimation where output volatility is regressed against a series of independent variables. The 
estimated coefficients are then used as the weights for the calculation of a vulnerability index. The 
problem with such an approach is two-fold. First there may be issues with the estimation procedure 
itself, owing to either unobserved heterogeneity or the selection of countries that will affect the 
estimated coefficients, but ultimately the main problem is that it is a non-transparent methodology 
that will be hard to defend in the international arena. Going down the composite indicator route, 
despite its shortcomings, has the important advantage of being transparent and easily predictable. 
In the creation of a composite index, we follow the recommendations of Lopez Gonzalez et al. (2011) 
where we use readily available international datasets to identify the different sets of constraints above 
outlined.  
6.1 Method 
Once the constraints that countries face in their implementation of TRIPs provisions have been 
outlined one need identify and combine the indicators that capture these constraints. We approach 
this using an aggregation technique that relies on rankings. Hence for each indicator we rank 
countries against each other, we then use the common ranking unit and apply sets of weights to create 
a composite indicator. Setting these weights can be somewhat arbitrary and hence it is suggested that 
these be the result of a negotiated procedure. This suggestion stands on the precedent of negotiated 
coefficients for the Swiss formula for developing country liberalisation. The particular structure of 
weights that we employ in this paper serve as an illustration; in particular, we set uniform weights 
across each constraint and then simulate changes to these to determine the sensitivity of the lists 
according to the weights chosen. 
We first relate each constraint to its corresponding indicator. Taking the economic constraints first, 
which gauges the distributional implications and the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical sector we 
use the following indicators: 
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• Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) on pharmaceutical products using 2008 exports. 
Source UN Comtrade.  
• Share of pharmaceutical products in total imports using 2008 imports. Source: UN Comtrade 
• Share in World Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP year 2008. Source: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
To assess the degree of access to pharmaceutical products across countries (or the access constraints) 
we look at purchasing power and domestic supply capacity by way of the following indicators: 
• GDP per capita (PPP) year 2008. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
• Grubel-Lloyd (X-M)/(X+M) for the year 2008. Source: UN Comtrade 
Looking then at capacity constraints where implementation costs are being captured uses: 
• Per capita total expenditure on health for the year 2008 (PPP). Source: WHO 
• Population year 2008. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Finally, the incidence of disease constraint is addressed by taking the simple average between the 
ranks obtained from the following indicators: 
• DALYs per 100,000 people on Infectious and parasitic diseases (2004). Source: WHO 
• DALYs per 100,000 people on rest of diseases and conditions (2004). Source: WHO 
The DALY on the ‘rest of diseases and conditions’ is obtained by subtracting the number of DALYs 
due to infectious and parasitic diseases from the total number of DALYs. Therefore, the DALYs on the 
rest of diseases also contains the incidence of other conditions not directly related with the use of 
pharmaceutical and medicines such as injuries and deaths due to accidents or conflicts. It is possible 
to construct a more refined indicator that circumscribes to agents and diseases that can be prevented 
and treated by medicines. However, the incidence on the ranking is expected to be minimal. 
For each constraint we use an average ranking score hence deriving a preliminary composite score 
across each constraint. Whilst it is already possible to introduce weights at this stage, we choose not to 
as we are interested in identifying not only the overall rankings in terms of all conditions, but also the 
countries that are most constrained by each of the conditions. Effectively, this method is analogous to 
placing an equal weighting to each of the indicators within a given constraint. One of the benefits of 
such an approach is that it allows us to subsume the weights to be chosen by a negotiated approach 
into a more compact form where these can be chosen according to a constraint rather than the more 
abstract indicator. Implicitly, we recommend that negotiations be made on the weights of the 
constraints rather than those of the indicators themselves. 
We then need determine the geographical applicability of such a procedure. We suggest that this be 
applied predominantly across the self-selecting ‘developing country’ grouping. Developed countries 
are already well defined as are the LDCs. The problem in the application of differential treatment 
mainly arises through the heterogeneity of the developing grouping where richer countries like Korea 
are placed on an equal footing with poorer countries such as Kenya. The desirability of such an 
approach and a discussion of this heterogeneity is provided in Lopez Gonzalez et al (2011). Applying 
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this procedure to developing countries only is likely to be contentious, but it is justified on the basis 
that some countries are better equipped to implement new WTO legislations than others and that the 
analytical criteria chosen should be able to differentiate across these. But the method that we propose 
is equally applicable to all countries within the WTO as the calculation of rankings is independent of 
the amount of countries that are considered. Despite our recommendation that this procedure be 
applied to the developing country grouping alone, we present results where we include the LDCs too. 
This is to ensure a certain degree of coherence across the analysis and to show that even when the 
criteria are applied across all non-developed countries the lists that are created generate results 
coherent with the exclusion of LDCs from general WTO principles. 
The choice of weights will then be pivotal in the creation of a final list of countries. The heterogeneity 
present in the developing country group will manifest itself through the rankings according to each 
constraint, hence giving more weighting to one over the other is likely to produce somewhat different 
lists. Clearly, under a negotiated procedure, countries most afflicted by a given constraint are likely to 
lobby stronger for it to receive a higher weighting in the final decision. Some countries will have 
important pharmaceutical production and trade, but will be afflicted by higher degrees of disease 
incidence. These will negotiate for stronger weights on the latter rather than the former. Our method 
circumvents the multidimensionality of the issue by using information on all constraints, but the 
weighting will remain subject to negotiations and hence, to a certain extent to a degree or 
arbitrariness. Despite the possibility of reducing this arbitrariness of selection of weights through 
econometric techniques such as  in Commonwealth (1999), this comes at the cost of increasing 
complexity and reducing the transparency of the process. In addition, the use of such techniques is 
unlikely to be accepted as previous attempts have demonstrated36.   
6.2 Results 
Using the above methodology, we present some preliminary results on what the lists could look like 
given certain assumptions on the weighting structure. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to illustrate 
how the variation in the weights chosen affects the final outcome. Before we turn to this we look at the 
correlation across the different indicators. If these are found to be collinear, then the weighting 
structure is likely to matter very little. A high degree of correlation suggests the use of one indicator 
rather than a selection of indicators thus reducing frictions arising through negotiated processes and 
on the basis that it would provide sufficient information on country standings. Table 8 shows that 
indicators across the different constraints do not have high degrees of correlation and hence variance 
across these can be exploited for the selection procedure. Variance within constraints is equally 
interesting. For the case of economic constraints we see that the RCA and the share of exports are 
collinear which suggests that we can drop one of these indicators without loss of generality37. Other 
than the health indicators, the within group correlation seems to be low suggesting that we are 
                                                            
36 The weights assigned to the unit values obtained from the databases COMTRADE and WTO IDB to transform non-ad 
valorem tariff into ad-valorem equivalents for both applied and bound tariffs in the Agriculture negotiations in the Doha 
round were subject of negotiations and not the result of any econometric analysis on the characteristics of the two databases 
used.  
37 WE drop the share of export in the creation of the lists 
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capturing different aspects of each of the identified constraints. The between constraint correlations 
also provide important information. If we take the RCA measure and the Normalised Trade Balance 
measure we see a strong correlation. This is expected as competitive countries should be those that are 
better off in their trade balance. Another notable correlation is that of per capita expenditure on health 
and GDP per capita and suggests that some of the capacity constraints and the access ones may be 
determined simultaneously. The negative correlation between the health outcomes and the other 
constraints suggests that access, capacity and economic constraints can affect health outcomes. What 
is interesting is that there is a positive relation between health outcomes and the share of 
pharmaceutical imports in total trade. This then points to access to pharmaceuticals via imports as a 
contributing factor to improved health outcomes. Although these correlations do not imply causation 
and the relation might be spurious it remains insightful to look at these and derive some prima facie 
observations on the co-movement of the identified variables. In particular on how these may affect the 
health outcomes variables. 
Table 8: Correlation Coefficients across selected indicators 
    Economic Access Capacity Health 
   RC
A 
 
Sh
ar
e 
in
 to
ta
l e
xp
or
ts
 
Sh
ar
e 
in
 im
po
rt
s 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 w
or
ld
 G
D
P 
 
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 
X-
M
/(X
+
M
)  
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
he
al
th
 
(p
.c
ap
) 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
D
AL
Y 
- I
PD
 
D
AL
Y 
- R
es
t 
RCA  1.00          
Share in total exports              1.00 1.00         
Share in imports -0.00 -0.00 1.00        
Economic 
Share of world GDP  0.08 0.08 -0.18 1.00       
GDP per capita 0.08 0.08 -0.27 0.04 1.00      Access 
X-M/(X+M)  0.72 0.72 -0.20 0.40 0.05 1.00     
 expenditure on health 
(p.cap) 0.31 0.32 -0.24 0.06 0.83 0.27 1.00    Capacity  
Population 0.12 0.12 - 0.18 0.92 -0.07 0.44 -0.09 1.00   
DALY – IPD -0.26 -0.26 0.40 -0.17 -0.37 -0.31 -  0.47 -0.09 1.00  Health 
DALY – Rest -0.26 -0.25 0.40 -0.14 -0.47 -0.28 - 0.55 -0.04 0.79 1.00 
 
6.2.1 Arbitrary or negotiated weighting structure 
As a first exercise, we provide a list of 25 countries, in Table 9, where we apply different sets of weights 
across the different constraints (we hold constant a uniform weighting structure within these). These 
lists serve to identify the countries that may be considered for graduation from SDT provisions in the 
pharmaceutical sector. In the first column we use a uniformly weighted structure. In the remaining 
columns, a higher weight (0.7) is assigned to the lead constraint in the title and 0.1 to the others. 
Hence for the ‘Higher Economic’ column, the economic constraints receive a weight of 70% and the 
remaining constraints one of 10% in the composite indicator. For expositional purposes we present 
only the top 25 countries, but the entire list can be found in the appendix (Table A1). 
Table 9  Composite Index under different weights on constraints 
Equal Weights Higher Economic Higher Access to pharmaceuticals Higher Capacity constraints Incidence of diseases 
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Rep. Korea 11.7 China 13.5 Israel 7.7 Rep. Korea 10.4 Israel 7.7 
Israel 15.4 Rep. Korea 15.9 Rep. Korea 12.2 Mexico 14.0 Rep. Korea 8.3 
Mexico 15.5 India 16.0 Argentina 13.0 Argentina 14.5 Chile 12.0 
Argentina 17.5 Mexico 19.2 Mexico 13.7 Brazil 17.3 UAE 12.5 
Chile 19.4 Israel 22.8 Croatia 17.2 Turkey 19.3 Mexico 15.2 
China 20.8 Malaysia 23.6 Chile 18.3 Chile 21.6 Costa Rica 15.5 
Turkey 22.7 Argentina 24.2 Uruguay 19.3 Israel 23.6 Qatar 17.0 
Croatia 24.2 Indonesia 25.3 Costa Rica 20.6 China 24.5 Oman 17.1 
Malaysia 24.4 Chile 25.8 Turkey 22.3 Malaysia 25.7 Croatia 18.1 
UAE 26.0 Thailand 27.3 Macedonia 23.0 South Africa 25.7 Argentina 18.4 
Costa Rica 26.8 Turkey 28.7 Malaysia 23.0 Saudi Arabia 26.3 Bahrain 19.0 
Brazil 27.5 Morocco 29.5 Brazil 24.2 Colombia 27.9 China 20.3 
Uruguay 28.0 Uruguay 29.8 China 24.8 Venezuela 28.7 Turkey 20.5 
Colombia 30.8 Pakistan 30.0 Colombia 24.9 Egypt 30.7 Jordan 22.2 
Oman 31.6 Croatia 30.5 UAE 26.6 Croatia 31.0 Malaysia 25.4 
Macedonia 32.6 Egypt 30.7 Oman 28.2 Thailand 31.6 Macedonia 25.7 
Jordan 32.9 UAE 30.8 Jordan 28.8 Ukraine 32.4 Saudi Arabia 25.7 
Egypt 33.1 Brazil 31.0 Mauritius 30.5 UAE 34.1 Uruguay 27.7 
Thailand 33.2 Colombia 33.9 Thailand 31.3 Costa Rica 34.4 Tunisia 28.2 
Saudi Arabia 33.5 South Africa 34.3 South Africa 32.9 Peru 34.8 Saint Lucia 28.3 
Qatar 34.3 Paraguay 35.1 Peru 33.0 Uruguay 35.2 Venezuela 29.3 
Morocco 34.3 Oman 36.2 Venezuela 33.8 India 36.4 Panama 29.4 
Venezuela 35.1 Bangladesh 36.4 India 34.6 Viet Nam 36.8 Georgia 29.5 
India 35.5 Philippines 36.4 Indonesia 34.9 Morocco 37.1 Albania 30.6 
Peru 35.9 Costa Rica 36.5 Egypt 34.9 Indonesia 39.4 Morocco 32.3 
 
Despite the weights and cut-off points being set subjectively, the results obtained already point to 
some important issues in the implementation of such an approach. First to be noted is that there 
appears to be a certain degree of homogeneity across the lists where 12 countries appear in the top 25 
irrespective of the weights used. Table 10 identifies these countries where the column with the heading 
‘5’ identifies the countries that are in the top 25 in the 5 instances of Table 8. Taking the example of 
Korea and Israel, we see that not only are these countries in all lists, but they are in fact in the top 
places in these classifications. This category of country, which would also include the likes of Mexico, 
Argentina, Chile and Turkey are those where, on the basis of our methodology, a re-classification and 
hence re-incorporation into the general provisions of the agreement can be supported. These should 
not receive differential treatment in TRIPs provisions. But whilst, and under the assumption that this 
methodology is ratified, there will be little dispute about this selection of countries, it is in the 
consideration of the countries that appear near the bottom of the table, hence near the threshold, or in 
some lists but not others, that complications will arise in the selection procedure. Taking the example 
of Brazil which appears in all but the incidence of disease column, one need carefully consider how 
such a country is to be treated with respect to TRIPs commitments. Would there be enough support to 
leaving Brazil out of SDT provisions on the basis of the other constraints, or should weights be geared 
to disease outcomes rather than economic considerations? These are important issues for negotiation, 
but a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 10: Count of appearances in Table 9 
Times in top 25 lists with different weights 
5 4 3 2 1 
Argentina Brazil Saudi Arabia El Salvador Albania 
Chile Colombia South Africa Indonesia Bahrain 
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China Egypt Tunisia Oman Georgia 
Costa Rica India UAE Pakistan Peru 
Croatia Jordan Venezuela Paraguay Qatar 
Israel Macedonia    St Lucia 
Korea Panama    Ukraine 
Malaysia Thailand    Vietnam
Mexico        
Morrocco        
Turkey        
Uruguay         
 
The case of India presents similar challenges to those of Brazil. Having a strong pharmaceutical 
industry, higher weights on economic constraint (where it ranks third after China and Korea) imply 
graduation into general provisions, however its very low position in the other constraints suggest that 
India could be exempted from the general provisions of the TRIPS agreement. India’s sensitivity to the 
chosen threshold is important too. If we had chosen this to be the top 20 countries rather than the top 
25, India would have only appeared in the list of excluded countries on economic grounds. Its low 
GDP per capita and expenditure on health coupled with a high incidence of disease would suggest that 
India would not be graduated on the basis of a threshold set at 20 countries. The case of India serves to 
illustrate the broader issues that arise from the selection of both weights and thresholds. 
Similar to the determination of the weights, there are different procedures that can be invoked to 
determine the thresholds in addition to the arbitrary top 20-25 country procedure discussed above. 
One can use statistical methods, once the weights have been agreed, and exclude countries in the top 
deciles of the composite score. The outcomes of this procedure will then depend not only on a 
country’s performance but also on the performance of the rest of the countries or the relative position 
in the distribution. But this threshold continues being arbitrary and not related to any observable 
criteria. One can also have a threshold that is determined through other observable criteria. A first 
alternative in this line is to use a score threshold. If a country is below a given score then it can be 
considered for graduation into the general agreement provisions. However, given the composite 
nature of the indicators, the setting of this threshold number would also be devoid of objectivity. In 
addition, rankings, being ordinal in nature would be valid in relative terms but lack interpretational 
value hence will be hard to justify to a country that is near the threshold and asked to graduate 
because they score under say 30. 
It is possible then to choose the threshold in terms of other criteria. One possibility is selecting 
countries that would be exempted from general provisions on the basis of a cumulative participation 
in world trade or in pharmaceutical trade. In Table 11 we present such a procedure where the 
selection is made on the basis of a threshold of a cumulative share in either total or pharmaceutical 
trade (or indeed on both). Here the negotiated threshold would be one where countries agree on an 
acceptable amount of trade that can be excluded from general provisions. Let us then consider that 
accord is reached on a threshold that exempts countries which, ranked according to the list, occupy 
only 5% of trade in Pharmaceuticals. Table 11 shows that under such threshold criteria and for an 
equal weights approach (first column), the cut-off point would stand after Venezuela. This would 
leave India as a country which holds its rights to receive differential treatment in TRIPs provisions. 
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What is interesting with such an approach is that it is not subject to a choice of countries that can 
benefit from derogations, but rather based on an acceptable part of the market that can be excluded 
from general provisions. 
Despite this approach being interesting, one can easily argue that there is a certain level of endogeneity 
in the sense that countries with lax implementation of TRIPs provisions are likely to be engaged in the 
production of generic pharmaceuticals rather than engaging in trade. One can then take a similar 
threshold but base it on the cumulative share of world trade. The negotiated ‘exclusion zone’ would be 
something akin to a total market share of a certain value. For illustrative purposes we take this market 
share to be 20% of world import demand which can be excluded from the TRIPs agreement. Under 
such a threshold 20% of the world trade market receives SDT in TRIPs provisions. Here the cut-off 
point in the first column will stand between Croatia and Malaysia. 
This analytical criteria based approach to the selection of graduating countries is not without its 
problems either. Trade based measures can be volatile particularly in their compilation in more recent 
years. This means that countries near the threshold would graduate in and out of the provisions 
regularly. To avoid such instances, one can propose setting the trade based thresholds on averages 
across a selection of years. Determining graduation into and out of the commitments in TRIPs 
provisions would then be subject to breaching the established ceiling during a pre established period 
of time. This is similar to the technique that the EU uses in determining graduation into and out of 
preferential status in the GSP. Additionally, and as can be seen from Table 11, the cut-off points may 
occur in between a given country’s trade, hence a decision need be made if countries where these 
instances occur are to be graduated in or out of the provisions. Let us consider that the negotiated 
approach yields a cut off point of 10% of pharmaceutical trade and an equally weighted structure 
across the indicators (column 1). The case of Turkey becomes ambiguous as the greater share of its 
trade is within the negotiated limit of exclusion but there is a significant part that lies outside this 
limit. One need then think very carefully on how to treat such instances.    
Table 11. Ranked countries and cumulative share of trade in pharmaceuticals and in total trade 
Equal Weights Higher Economic Higher Access to pharma Higher Capacity constraints Incidence of diseases 
  ph tot   ph tot   ph tot   ph tot   ph tot 
Rep. 
Korea 83.6 63.0 China 85.4 70.0 Israel 83.9 59.8 Rep. Korea 83.6 63.0 Israel 83.9 59.8 
Israel 84.8 63.5 Rep. Korea 86.3 73.8 Rep. Korea 84.8 63.5 Mexico 84.8 65.6 
Rep. 
Korea 84.8 63.5 
Mexico 86.1 66.1 India 87.9 75.9 Argentina 85.2 64.1 Argentina 85.2 66.1 Chile 85.0 64.1 
Argentina 86.5 66.7 Mexico 89.1 78.6 Mexico 86.5 66.7 Brazil 86.4 67.8 UAE 85.2 65.6 
Chile 86.6 67.2 Israel 90.4 79.1 Croatia 86.7 66.9 Turkey 87.5 69.2 Mexico 86.5 68.2 
China 89.4 78.0 Malaysia 90.6 80.7 Chile 86.9 67.4 Chile 87.7 69.8 
Costa 
Rica 86.6 68.3 
Turkey 90.5 79.5 Argentina 91.0 81.2 Uruguay 86.9 67.5 Israel 88.9 70.3 Qatar 86.7 68.7 
Croatia 90.7 79.7 Indonesia 91.2 82.4 Costa Rica 87.1 67.6 China 91.7 81.1 Oman 86.7 68.9 
Malaysia 90.9 81.3 Chile 91.4 82.9 Turkey 88.2 69.1 Malaysia 91.9 82.7 Croatia 86.9 69.1 
UAE 91.2 82.7 Thailand 91.7 84.5 Macedonia 88.2 69.1 
South 
Africa 92.3 83.4 
Argentin
a 87.4 69.7 
Costa Rica 91.3 82.9 Turkey 92.8 85.9 Malaysia 88.4 70.7 
Saudi 
Arabia 92.7 85.2 Bahrain 87.4 69.8 
Brazil 92.6 84.5 Morocco 92.9 86.2 Brazil 89.6 72.3 Colombia 93.0 85.6 China 90.1 80.6 
Uruguay 92.6 84.5 Uruguay 92.9 86.3 China 92.4 83.1 Venezuela 93.4 86.1 Turkey 91.2 82.0 
Colombia 92.9 84.9 Pakistan 93.1 86.5 Colombia 92.7 83.4 Egypt 93.6 86.5 Jordan 91.4 82.1 
Oman 93.0 85.1 Croatia 93.3 86.7 UAE 93.0 84.9 Croatia 93.9 86.7 Malaysia 91.6 83.7 
Macedoni 93.0 85.2 Egypt 93.6 87.1 Oman 93.0 85.2 Thailand 94.2 88.2 Macedon 91.6 83.7 
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Equal Weights Higher Economic Higher Access to pharma Higher Capacity constraints Incidence of diseases 
  ph tot   ph tot   ph tot   ph tot   ph tot 
a ia 
Jordan 93.2 85.3 UAE 93.8 88.6 Jordan 93.2 85.3 Ukraine 94.8 88.9 
Saudi 
Arabia 92.0 85.5 
Egypt 93.5 85.6 Brazil 95.0 90.2 Mauritius 93.2 85.3 UAE 95.0 90.4 Uruguay 92.1 85.6 
Thailand 93.8 87.1 Colombia 95.3 90.5 Thailand 93.6 86.8 Costa Rica 95.2 90.5 Tunisia 92.2 85.8 
Saudi 
Arabia 94.2 89.0 
South 
Africa 95.7 91.2 
South 
Africa 93.9 87.5 Peru 95.3 90.8 
Saint 
Lucia 92.2 85.8 
Qatar 94.2 89.3 Paraguay 95.8 91.3 Peru 94.0 87.8 Uruguay 95.3 90.8 
Venezuel
a 92.5 86.4 
Morocco 94.3 89.6 Oman 95.8 91.5 Venezuela 94.4 88.4 India 96.9 93.0 Panama 92.6 86.4 
Venezuela 94.7 90.2 
Banglades
h 95.8 91.7 India 96.0 90.5 Viet Nam 97.1 93.6 Georgia 92.7 86.5 
India 96.3 92.4 
Philippine
s 96.0 92.2 Indonesia 96.1 91.7 Morocco 97.2 93.9 Albania 92.7 86.5 
Peru 96.4 92.6 Costa Rica 96.2 92.3 Egypt 96.4 92.1 Indonesia 97.4 95.1 Morocco 92.8 86.8 
Source: Own 
Notes: the share of developed countries in pharmaceutical trade, with the help of table (put reference to table presented before), is around 
78%. On the other hand, the share of developed countries in total trade is around 49% 
  
We do not preclude the use of other indicators in setting the thresholds. In fact, some of the same 
indicators used in calculating the rankings could serve the purpose of setting the thresholds. This is 
because in calculating these rankings we use the ordinal nature and not the cardinal properties which 
could serve to inform the thresholds. One could also use the share of world GDP to determine the size 
of the acceptable excluded market. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown how one could go about creating a system where SDT is made contingent 
on a set of analytical criteria which are grounded on the identification of constraints in meeting the 
demands of the international system. Our results indicate that the use of composite indicators and 
subsequent rankings can serve to evaluate the desirability of implementing WTO TRIPs 
commitments. In the process we discuss the role of negotiations in setting the weights of each 
constraint and the thresholds that delimit the applicability of SDT for the TRIPs agreement. Our 
results suggest that there are countries classified within the ‘developing country’ grouping that may 
have surpassed the general constraints that make enforcement undesirable. This implicitly recognises 
that there are other sets of countries within this grouping that face mitigating circumstances which 
make the implementation of TRIPs commitments objectionable. Instead of fixed time-delayed 
enforcement of WTO TRIPs provisions, we propose the use of graduating thresholds to determine 
countries that should be streamlined into the general provisions of the TRIPs agreement and those 
that should not. 
However the principle of graduation needs careful consideration. Primarily, negotiations on the 
applied thresholds (as well as the weighting structure) are likely to be contentious given what is at 
stake. Additionally, one need consider that even for countries at the top end of the classification, 
constraints in implementing TRIPS commitments will remain as the case of Brazil shows. Countries 
that are close to the negotiated thresholds will also need to receive special considerations too. The 
assessment of the outlined constraints must be carried out periodically and graduation should be 
based on a breach of the thresholds during an established period of time. This will ensure that 
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countries near the threshold do not graduate or de-graduate at each assessment. These countries 
should also begin to receive assistance in view of upgrading their capacity to deal with the new 
provisions that graduation bring into force. Similarly, special attention need also be given to the 
existence of volatile economic cycles and catastrophic health pandemics. To the extent that these can 
be captured through similar sets of indicators, they also need to feed into the provision of differential 
treatment.  
The contribution of this paper is not limited to the case of SDT in WTO TRIPs commitments as the 
method can be generalised to other WTO provisions. The methodological foundations, following the 
recommendations of Lopez Gonzalez et al. (2011), suggest that any award of SDT need be primarily 
based on the identification of the constraints and the distributional implications that enforcement of 
WTO provisions imply. These then need be associated to a set of observable criteria which need be 
combined to capture the prevalence of the constraints across countries. Using weights and thresholds 
to create a composite indicator, we suggest that such a method is desirable in providing a more 
targeted and needs-based approach to SDT. The transparency and predictability of this simple 
approach makes for a more realistic implementation that an approach based on econometric 
estimation.  
But this approach is not without its shortcomings. It requires that countries accept sets of common 
indicators to be used to capture other identified and agreed upon constraints. It also adds more 
negotiating issues to an already over-burdened negotiating table and pre-supposes that accord will be 
reached. However, in light of the current deadlock in the negotiating process, such an approach to 
SDT may offer desirable flexibilities and hence help shape a new system that is more development 
friendly.    
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Annex 
 
Table A1. Composite Ranking under different weights 
Equal Weights Higher Economic Higher Access to pharma 
Higher Capacity 
constraints Incidence of diseases 
Republic of 
Korea 11.7 China 13.5 Israel 7.7 
Republic of 
Korea 10.4 Israel 7.7 
Israel 15.4 Korea 15.9 Korea 12.2 Mexico 14.0 Korea 8.3 
Mexico 15.5 India 16.0 Argentina 13.0 Argentina 14.5 Chile 12.0 
Argentina 17.5 Mexico 19.2 Mexico 13.7 Brazil 17.3 UAE 12.5 
Chile 19.4 Israel 22.8 Croatia 17.2 Turkey 19.3 Mexico 15.2 
China 20.8 Malaysia 23.6 Chile 18.3 Chile 21.6 Costa Rica 15.5 
Turkey 22.7 Argentina 24.2 Uruguay 19.3 Israel 23.6 Qatar 17.0 
Croatia 24.2 Indonesia 25.3 Costa Rica 20.6 China 24.5 Oman 17.1 
Malaysia 24.4 Chile 25.8 Turkey 22.3 Malaysia 25.7 Croatia 18.1 
UAE 26.0 Thailand 27.3 Macedonia 23.0 South Africa 25.7 Argentina 18.4 
Costa Rica 26.8 Turkey 28.7 Malaysia 23.0 
Saudi 
Arabia 26.3 Bahrain 19.0 
Brazil 27.5 Morocco 29.5 Brazil 24.2 Colombia 27.9 China 20.3 
Uruguay 28.0 Uruguay 29.8 China 24.8 Venezuela 28.7 Turkey 20.5 
Colombia 30.8 Pakistan 30.0 Colombia 24.9 Egypt 30.7 Jordan 22.2 
Oman 31.6 Croatia 30.5 UAE 26.6 Croatia 31.0 Malaysia 25.4 
Macedonia 32.6 Egypt 30.7 Oman 28.2 Thailand 31.6 Macedonia 25.7 
Jordan 32.9 UAE 30.8 Jordan 28.8 Ukraine 32.4 
Saudi 
Arabia 25.7 
Egypt 33.1 Brazil 31.0 Mauritius 30.5 UAE 34.1 Uruguay 27.7 
Thailand 33.2 Colombia 33.9 Thailand 31.3 Costa Rica 34.4 Tunisia 28.2 
Saudi 
Arabia 33.5 South Africa 34.3 South Africa 32.9 Peru 34.8 Saint Lucia 28.3 
Qatar 34.3 Paraguay 35.1 Peru 33.0 Uruguay 35.2 Venezuela 29.3 
Morocco 34.3 Oman 36.2 Venezuela 33.8 India 36.4 Panama 29.4 
Venezuela 35.1 Bangladesh 36.4 India 34.6 Viet Nam 36.8 Georgia 29.5 
India 35.5 Philippines 36.4 Indonesia 34.9 Morocco 37.1 Albania 30.6 
Peru 35.9 Costa Rica 36.5 Egypt 34.9 Indonesia 39.4 Morocco 32.3 
Tunisia 36.0 Peru 37.2 El Salvador 35.0 Tunisia 39.6 Mauritius 34.7 
Panama 37.4 Jordan 37.2 Panama 37.2 Philippines 40.4 Viet Nam 34.7 
Indonesia 37.6 
Saudi 
Arabia 37.6 Tunisia 37.5 Qatar 40.7 Paraguay 35.8 
Bahrain 37.8 Macedonia 37.7 Paraguay 37.6 Ecuador 40.9 Colombia 36.3 
South Africa 38.7 Viet Nam 38.0 Guatemala 38.2 Lebanon 41.4 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 36.3 
Paraguay 39.2 Tunisia 38.8 Morocco 38.3 Panama 41.7 Egypt 36.4 
Viet Nam 39.4 Qatar 39.9 Qatar 39.5 Pakistan 43.4 Lebanon 37.2 
Mauritius 40.1 
Dominican 
Republic 40.9 
Dominican 
Republic 39.7 Jordan 43.5 Brazil 37.4 
Ukraine 42.0 Panama 41.4 Fiji 40.5 
Dominican 
Republic 43.6 Dominica 38.0 
El Salvador 42.4 Guatemala 41.5 Bahrain 40.6 Guatemala 43.6 Peru 38.7 
Pakistan 42.4 El Salvador 42.2 Pakistan 41.3 Macedonia 44.3 Jamaica 40.6 
Philippines 42.5 Mauritius 42.5 Botswana 41.6 Oman 44.7 Armenia 41.4 
Dominican 
Republic 43.6 Ukraine 43.0 Ecuador 42.4 Bahrain 45.7 Ecuador 41.5 
Guatemala 43.6 Bahrain 45.9 Ukraine 43.2 Nigeria 46.2 Thailand 42.7 
Georgia 43.8 Kenya 46.0 
Saudi 
Arabia 44.3 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 47.8 Fiji 42.9 
Ecuador 43.8 Nigeria 46.3 Georgia 45.7 El Salvador 47.9 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 43.5 
Lebanon 44.1 Sri Lanka 46.5 Bangladesh 46.2 Sri Lanka 48.2 Moldova 43.6 
Saint Lucia 44.5 Saint Lucia 47.6 Philippines 47.0 Paraguay 48.4 El Salvador 44.6 
Bangladesh 47.9 Fiji 48.2 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 47.2 Georgia 50.5 Philippines 46.1 
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Trinidad 
and Tobago 48.1 Venezuela 48.4 Saint Lucia 47.2 Bangladesh 50.7 Nicaragua 46.9 
Albania 48.7 Botswana 49.0 Bolivia 47.6 Albania 51.9 Grenada 47.0 
Fiji 49.6 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 49.3 Lebanon 48.0 Botswana 52.4 Cape Verde 47.2 
Sri Lanka 50.7 Georgia 49.3 Viet Nam 48.2 Mauritius 53.0 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 48.4 
Armenia 52.5 Lebanon 50.1 Swaziland 53.0 Ghana 53.1 Namibia 49.4 
Botswana 53.0 Ecuador 50.3 Kenya 53.7 Kenya 53.7 Ukraine 49.5 
Republic of 
Moldova 53.5 Ghana 50.5 Namibia 53.9 Bolivia 54.5 
Dominican 
Republic 50.5 
Bolivia 53.8 Angola 51.5 Armenia 54.0 Saint Lucia 55.0 Indonesia 51.1 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 54.0 Senegal 52.4 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 55.2 Angola 55.1 Sri Lanka 51.2 
Jamaica 54.3 Tanzania 52.6 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 55.2 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 55.8 Guatemala 51.4 
Kenya 55.4 Bolivia 52.7 Ghana 56.1 Honduras 56.7 
Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 52.3 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 55.5 Albania 53.3 Moldova 56.2 Uganda 56.9 Honduras 53.1 
Ghana 56.2 Armenia 53.8 
Papua New 
Guinea 56.8 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 57.3 Belize 53.9 
Namibia 56.8 Jamaica 55.1 Sri Lanka 56.9 Moldova 57.4 India 55.0 
Honduras 57.6 Honduras 56.7 Angola 57.8 Cambodia 58.7 Pakistan 55.1 
Nigeria 57.7 Moldova 56.8 Nigeria 58.5 Jamaica 58.9 Mongolia 55.2 
Grenada 58.1 
Papua New 
Guinea 58.3 Grenada 59.0 Nicaragua 59.2 Maldives 55.2 
Dominica 59.7 Nepal 59.1 Albania 59.1 Namibia 59.6 Suriname 57.5 
Nicaragua 61.0 Cambodia 61.6 
Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 59.5 Tanzania 59.7 Bangladesh 58.5 
Suriname 61.3 Suriname 62.7 Gabon 59.8 Cameroon 60.4 Kyrgyzstan 60.1 
Papua New 
Guinea 61.6 Djibouti 63.4 Dominica 61.4 Gabon 60.4 Bolivia 60.2 
Senegal 62.4 Mongolia 63.9 Congo 61.8 Armenia 60.9 South Africa 62.0 
Angola 62.6 Uganda 64.2 Cape Verde 62.2 Senegal 61.0 
Papua New 
Guinea 63.7 
Maldives 63.1 Namibia 64.3 Suriname 62.3 Nepal 61.8 Ghana 65.1 
Mongolia 63.8 Grenada 64.7 Jamaica 62.5 Grenada 62.0 Gabon 65.5 
Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 63.9 Haiti 65.5 Senegal 63.7 Maldives 62.4 Guyana 68.3 
Cape Verde 64.0 Nicaragua 65.8 Honduras 64.2 Suriname 62.6 Kenya 68.4 
Gabon 64.8 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 66.0 Djibouti 66.0 Dominica 64.1 Nepal 68.7 
Belize 65.0 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 66.1 Mongolia 66.0 Kyrgyzstan 65.5 Botswana 68.9 
Nepal 65.1 Swaziland 66.4 Belize 66.2 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 65.7 Lesotho 69.3 
Tanzania 65.9 DR Congo 67.0 Chad 66.2 DR Congo 66.1 Congo 69.6 
Swaziland 66.5 Madagascar 67.4 Maldives 67.2 Fiji 66.6 Djibouti 72.6 
Cambodia 66.5 Maldives 67.4 Guyana 67.7 
Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 67.3 Senegal 72.7 
Kyrgyzstan 67.7 
Mozambiqu
e 67.5 Rwanda 68.8 Rwanda 67.6 Cambodia 73.7 
Uganda 68.0 Mauritania 67.7 Uganda 70.4 Madagascar 67.7 Madagascar 74.0 
Djibouti 68.9 Guyana 67.8 Nepal 71.1 Papua New 67.9 Mauritania 74.9 
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Guinea 
Guyana 69.4 Kyrgyzstan 68.1 Mali 71.6 Zambia 68.5 Haiti 74.9 
Congo 69.8 Cameroon 68.3 Cambodia 71.9 
Burkina 
Faso 68.5 Swaziland 77.3 
Madagascar 70.9 Belize 68.8 Nicaragua 72.1 Chad 68.6 Tanzania 77.4 
Haiti 71.7 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 68.8 Tanzania 74.1 
Mozambiqu
e 68.7 Gambia 78.1 
Cameroon 72.3 
Guinea-
Bissau 70.9 Madagascar 74.6 Swaziland 69.2 Cameroon 78.1 
Mozambiqu
e 74.1 Cape Verde 72.2 Mauritania 75.2 Mongolia 69.9 Nigeria 79.8 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 74.3 Congo 72.5 Haiti 75.8 Haiti 70.7 Benin 80.4 
Mauritania 74.6 Guinea 73.5 
Burkina 
Faso 76.0 Belize 71.0 Uganda 80.6 
Rwanda 75.2 Gabon 73.5 Burundi 76.2 Benin 71.1 
Mozambiqu
e 80.7 
Chad 75.6 Dominica 75.3 Kyrgyzstan 77.2 Mali 71.9 Togo 81.8 
DR Congo 75.9 Benin 75.3 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 78.3 Malawi 73.3 Guinea 82.7 
Benin 77.3 
Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 76.6 
Mozambiqu
e 79.8 Djibouti 73.8 
Burkina 
Faso 85.0 
Burkina 
Faso 77.5 Zambia 76.6 Zambia 80.2 Guyana 74.0 Rwanda 86.2 
Mali 77.6 Sierra Leone 77.2 Lesotho 80.4 Guinea 74.3 Angola 86.3 
Lesotho 77.9 Rwanda 78.3 DR Congo 80.8 Cape Verde 74.5 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 87.0 
Zambia 79.0 Mali 78.5 Gambia 81.7 Congo 75.3 Chad 88.4 
Guinea 80.7 Chad 79.0 Benin 82.2 Togo 76.7 Mali 88.7 
Burundi 81.6 
Burkina 
Faso 80.6 Cameroon 82.3 Burundi 78.0 Burundi 88.8 
Gambia 82.0 Malawi 83.1 Malawi 83.5 Niger 78.0 DR Congo 89.8 
Malawi 82.8 Lesotho 83.4 Sierra Leone 86.0 Lesotho 78.6 
Guinea-
Bissau 90.6 
Togo 84.6 Burundi 83.7 
Guinea-
Bissau 87.0 Mauritania 80.9 Zambia 90.7 
Guinea-
Bissau 84.8 Gambia 86.0 Togo 91.7 Gambia 82.3 Malawi 91.3 
Sierra Leone 86.0 Niger 86.6 Guinea 92.3 Sierra Leone 84.5 
Central 
African 
Republic 93.1 
Niger 90.1 Togo 88.0 Niger 97.5 
Central 
African 
Republic 88.0 Sierra Leone 96.2 
Central 
African 
Republic 92.6 
Central 
African 
Republic 91.2 
Central 
African 
Republic 97.9 
Guinea-
Bissau 90.6 Niger 98.1 
 
